Social media: new spaces for contention in authoritarian systems by Belknap, Jason M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-12
Social media: new spaces for contention in
authoritarian systems
Belknap, Jason M.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









Thesis Advisor:  Anshu N. Chatterjee 
Co-Advisor: Anne Marie Baylouny 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
SOCIAL MEDIA: NEW SPACES FOR CONTENTION IN AUTHORITARIAN 
SYSTEMS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Jason M. Belknap 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
    What role has social media played in Bahraini political movements since 2011? Does it facilitate and 
encourage a space for free expressions of ideas, or do the dominant groups utilize social media to promote 
their agendas and shape social unrest outcomes? This thesis examines how the use of social media altered 
the course of protests in Bahrain on the heels of the regional Arab Spring movement. Historical protest 
activities incorporated the free space social media offered to offset the effects of government control and 
intimidation. This change resulted in a level of prolonged protests and violence never before seen in the 
country, where the momentum for change hung in the balance between protesters and an authoritarian 
regime. Social media played a role not only in organization and mobilization of the protests but also in the 
shaping of international opinion of the growing conflict. In the end, government and protesters alike used 
social media to further their agendas and minimize the effects of the others.  
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Social media, Bahrain, Arab Spring, social mobilization, Twitter, Facebook 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Jason M. Belknap 
Major, United States Army 
B.A., University of Northern Colorado, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  






















Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv




What role has social media played in Bahraini political movements since 
2011? Does it facilitate and encourage a space for free expressions of ideas, or do the 
dominant groups utilize social media to promote their agendas and shape social 
unrest outcomes? This thesis examines how the use of social media altered the course 
of protests in Bahrain on the heels of the regional Arab Spring movement. Historical 
protest activities incorporated the free space social media offered to offset the effects 
of government control and intimidation. This change resulted in a level of prolonged 
protests and violence never before seen in the country, where the momentum for 
change hung in the balance between protesters and an authoritarian regime. Social 
media played a role not only in organization and mobilization of the protests but also 
in the shaping of international opinion of the growing conflict. In the end, 
government and protesters alike used social media to further their agendas and 
minimize the effects of the others.  
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I. SOCIAL MEDIA: NEW SPACES FOR CONTENTION IN 
AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The February 2011 mass protests in the Pearl Roundabout, fueled by thousands of 
protesters, started the Arab Spring in Bahrain. Although the protest itself was a landmark 
event in the history of the country, the actions following the protest set the stage for this 
Gulf country’s current conflict and ongoing strife. Over the next two months, 35 civilians 
and members of the security forces died in the unrest.1 Accusations of torture and 
excessive police brutality soon followed with protesters using Facebook, Twitter, and 
other social media platforms to send their messages to both a local and a global audience. 
A new phase in a fight to win popular support and sway international opinion began in a 
society where access to the Internet and use of social media was higher than any other 
Gulf country.2 The ability to spread information and organize protests through social 
media initially appeared to put the momentum on the side of protesters. What started as 
calls for reform in the Bahraini government soon morphed into more radical calls for a 
regime change of the ruling Khalifa family.3  
On the heels of Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain appeared to be riding a wave of 
regional protest and activism.4 Protests and calls for governmental reforms in Bahrain 
were not new in 2011, but the ensuing protest organizations, coordination among protest 
groups, and speed at which protesters disseminated communication to each other and to 
the media at large, appeared to be new to the history of Bahraini protest and their 
potential to mobilize alarmed government officials. Given Bahrain’s history of protest 
                                                 
1 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Nigel S. Rodley, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
(Manama: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011), 219. 
2 “Middle East Internet Usage Statistics, Population, Facebook and Telecommunications Reports,” 
Internet World Stats, June 4, 2015, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm. 
3 Christopher, Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 207. 
4 Nicholas, D. Kristof, “Tunisia. Egypt. Bahrain?” New York Times, February 16, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/opinion/17kristof.html  
 2
movements and sectarian accusations of oppression and violence, what made this event 
different and what are the ramifications of the new social media-based protest? 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines the role of social media and its use in the continuing 
Bahraini protests. Specifically, what role has social media played in Bahraini political 
movements since 2011? Does it facilitate and encourage a space for free expressions of 
ideas or do the dominant groups utilize social media to promote their agenda and shape 
social unrest outcomes? Does the use of social media by both the protesters and 
government cancel the effects of the other? 
This thesis evaluates the role that social media played in disseminating 
information and organizing protests in real time by using information collected through 
social media forums, such as Facebook and Twitter, post-2011 in Bahrain. By analyzing 
the use of social media before, during, and after protest activities, this thesis evaluates 
whether social media enabled protests, and whether they increased the likelihood of 
success of the protest. Additionally, this thesis identifies how protest organizations as 
well as pro-government and government organizations used social media as a tool to 
inform and persuade popular opinion. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since grievances against the government were not new in 2011, Bahrain provides 
an excellent opportunity to examine the use of social media in protest activities.5 This 
study can thus provide insight into how social media was used to win popular perception; 
how Gulf country protest movements and governments use social media against 
protesters, risks, and threats; and how increased communication affects social 
mobilization theories. 
Since 2011, the use of social media as a free space to express ideas and 
communicate ideas locally, and in the region, has played an increasing role not only in 
                                                 
5 Laurence, Louer, “Activism in Bahrain between Sectarian and Issue Politics,” in Taking to the 
Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism, ed. Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 
2014), 172–98. 
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protests, but also in daily life. With Internet usage at more than 96 percent of the 
population as of 2015, Bahrain has the highest Internet penetration rate of any Gulf 
nation.6 Initial uses of social media to inform the public and media of protests have 
evolved into media campaigns to sway public opinion and organize protest movements. 
Protest groups use their online forums to post videos and pictures of protests and violence 
to bypass government control of print and other media outlets. Protesters found support 
through their use of social media when international news agencies picked up their stories 
and broadcast them to a larger regional and international audience. Not only were protest 
organizations active in this campaign, but government forces also worked quickly to 
increase their media campaign to combat what they deemed inaccurate reporting of 
terrorist acts in their country. Social media became a battleground to win popular 
perception of the ongoing violence that occurred following 2011.  
The increased use of social media in a small country such as Bahrain, with a high 
penetration of Internet usage and access to mobile devices, serves as a test bed for other 
social movements in the region. Studying the role of social media in Bahrain potentially 
will lead to a better understanding of other Gulf countries’ protest movements and 
possibly to an ability to predict future movements. Evaluating the role social media plays 
in Bahrain as a forum for free expression or means to persuade the population can lead to 
a better awareness of how other protest organizations, as well as governments, use the 
medium in the region. Bahrain serves as an example of not only expression of protest, but 
also how the government is using information from social media to target, arrest, and 
harass anti-government bloggers and organizations. 
The world is increasingly interconnecting through information sharing, yet the 
implications of this increased sharing and knowledge are not fully understood. Previously 
localized activities are now global events due to information sharing on social media 
sites. Historically, media outlets and media access in Bahrain is tightly controlled but 
through the use of Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and blogging, the world is now aware of 
                                                 
6 “Middle East Internet Usage Statistics, Population, Facebook and Telecommunications Reports,” 
June 4, 2015, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm. 
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daily life and protest activities that previously went underreported.7 Additionally, 
understanding the role of social media in protest activities enables security organizations 
to better track and target activist leaders and those claiming responsibility for protests and 
violence. The comprehension of social media’s use in this case study will further the 
ability to identify and target security risks and threats in other similar scenarios.8  
Bahrain is one of the poorest of the Gulf countries but as a high middle income 
nation nonetheless is facing a dilemma in transitioning from an oil wealth-based economy 
to a diversified economy.9 The outcome of this thesis can be applied to other rentier states 
and how their use of increased communication affects authoritarian government relations 
to their populations as they begin transitioning from oil-based economies to other 
revenues of financing. This study will assist in understanding whether the increased 
communication that social media provides destabilizes a rentier state government or if it 
just speeds up a process of democratization that was already established. Additionally, 
this study will contribute to democratization theory, which implies that increased 
development stabilizes a democratic society. Studying virtual or online social 
developments, as found in Bahrain, allows for a further application of this theory and to 
see if these virtual social developments offer the same stabilizing effects as in other 
cases. Studying the increased communication through social media in Bahrain offers 
insight into how virtual connections and communications affect a person’s feeling of 
relative deprivation. Due to Bahrain’s high concentration of Internet usage and 
connectivity, this thesis aims to understand if virtual connections are used as a free space 
to share ideas and mobilize the populace to offset or replace traditional face-to-face 
connections that bond people together.  
                                                 
7 Zahera Harb, “Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect,” Media-Culture Journal 14, no. 2 
(2011), http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/364Two. 
8 Taylor Dewey, Juliane Kaden, Miriam Marks, Shun Matsushima, and Beijing Zhu. “The Impact of 
Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring.” International Policy Program (2012). http://stage-
ips.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2012%20Practicum%20Policy%20Brief%20SocialMedia.pdf  
9 Christopher, Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (New York: 
Oxford, 2013), 205. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of social media and its effects on the Arab Spring is a fairly recent topic 
with limited studies. Some important articles are available but only a limited number of 
books address the subject. The relationship between social media and its interactions and 
effects on the Arab Spring is ongoing, especially in Bahrain, where it is continuing to 
evolve. To understand how different groups in Bahrain use social media, this literature 
review highlights the following three areas:  
1. How the historical and political settings effect Bahrain;  
2. How groups use social media locally to augment protest activities; and  
3. How social media activism relates to real world activism and the interplay 
between the two. 
1. Historical and Political Setting 
Bahrain provides an important case for studying social media. The country has a 
long history of established protest organizations organized to effect change within the 
government. The introduction of social media use in the early 2000s into the protest 
movements along with the highest Internet penetration of the Gulf region allow this study 
to focus on how these changes altered the course of the movements. Bahrain has a rich 
political history that includes a deep sectarian divide between a ruling Sunni elite and a 
Shia majority population. The country is strategically located between the two regional 
powers of each sect, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Political activism in this setting is unique and 
well portrayed by Laurence Louer. Louer argues that post 2011 Bahrain politics are 
highly unpredictable due not only to the sectarian divide, but also to the fractured 
components that occurred as a result of the protests and government response.10  
According to Louer, the main opposition party, Al Wefaq, “played by the rules of 
the cooptation game”11 of the government while more radical opposition groups, tired of 
                                                 
10 Laurence Louer, “Activism in Bahrain between Sectarian and Issue Politics,” in Taking to the 
Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism, ed. Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust (Baltimore: JHU Press, 
2014), 172–98. 
11 Ibid., 173. 
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what they felt were too many concessions, emerged. Since 2011, these radical groups 
have escalated the violence, with some labeled by the Bahraini government as terrorist 
organizations in 2014.12 With limited ability to meet openly and organize themselves, 
these groups used the virtual free spaces in which they felt comfortable to share and 
spread ideas. These more radical groups, along with those groups playing within the 
institutional framework, embraced social media as a venue to share and spread their 
ideas. These ideas included organizing protests and violence against the government. The 
challenge for these new and influential groups is their legitimacy and ability to negotiate 
with the government and other opposition groups. Their violent tactics and strident calls 
for the overthrow of the Khalifa government have so far denied them an ability to reduce 
any divides or obtain an audience with government officials. For the foreseeable future, 
their use of social media is their dialogue of choice. 
Louer’s article importantly identifies many of the key players in Bahraini politics 
since 2011 and ties them in a historical context. Understanding this context between 
players becomes critical to evaluating the role that social media plays in the evolution of 
ideas and protests that have ensued in the past four years. As new protest groups formed, 
some of them assumed a more moderate stance and aligned with Al Wefaq to negotiate 
with the government: their voices were quickly overshadowed by the more established 
party. The messages of these new groups appear to have been co-opted in return for a 
chance of dialogue. This is one example of how an established party uses social media to 
advance its cause, while at the same time causing cleavages in the formation of new 
protest organizations. 
After the initial violence of 2011 subsided, the King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa 
ordered an external audit of the actions that occurred not only by the protesters, but also 
by the government in the wake of an increased outcry of human rights abuses. He 
commissioned Cherif Bassiouni to lead a team of human rights lawyers to investigate and 
report on their findings. These findings are found in the Bahrain Independent 
                                                 
12 Eman Ragab, “Challenges of Countering Terrorism in the Middle East after the Arab Revolutions,” 
in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism among Youth to Prevent Terrorism, ed. Lombardi, 
Marco, E. Ragab, Vivienne Chin, Y. Dandurand, Valerio de Divitiis, and Alessandro Burato, (Amsterdam: 
IOS Press, 2014), 107.  
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Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report.13 This report provides a brief historical context, an 
understanding of the legal framework of the nation, and most important to this thesis, an 
in-depth look at the actions that occurred in February 2011. The actions outlined in the 
report have been accepted by both the government and the main opposition groups. The 
report identifies both human rights abuses and outlines steps the government should take 
in order to rectify and move forward from this event. 
The report allows an in-depth look at the actions and counteractions during the 
initial onset of violence in the country. Of note in the report is the government’s use of 
media harassment and using YouTube videos to document and review protest activities. 
The report highlights the fact that protest groups used YouTube videos to spread their 
ideas, which played a key role in the dissemination of information during this time when 
non-government biased media lacked access to the scene. Although important, the report 
must be considered for what it is, a snapshot in time of a particular event. The 
documentation of media bias and harassment in the report gives context to the free space 
that the Internet provided to protesters. 
Christopher Davidson’s After the Sheikhs provides a view of Bahrain in the 
context of a rentier state on the verge of collapse.14 The book promotes the idea that 
Bahrain, like the other Gulf States, is on the verge of collapse due to internal 
mismanagement along with social and economic pressures. Davidson illustrates decisions 
the government has taken that set the country on a path to change their system of 
governance. In the context of this path to change, the author identifies that the 
government has chosen censorship to maintain a grip on society by controlling 
information. In response to stricter censorship, Davidson concludes that Bahrainis moved 
to online forums to express discontent with the government in order to bypass censorship. 
In response, the government tightened controls of Internet usage by increasing Internet 
censorship and harassing bloggers on anti-government sites.15 Davidson cites the World 
                                                 
13 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Nigel S. Rodley, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry (Manama: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011), 219. 
14 Christopher, Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
15 Ibid., 146.  
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Press Freedom Index that as of 2015 ranks Bahrain “among the very worst countries in 
the world.”16  
The economic and social factors highlighted in this book help to understand 
Bahrain’s place in the Gulf and decisions they make as a rentier state. Although his 
writings do not center on protest activities or the current unrest and use of social media, 
they underscore that these protests are a mere manifestation of the changes that are 
already underway. If this is true, then the changes would occur with or without social 
media; it is just a matter of time.  
2. Social Media Use to Augment Protest Movements 
The idea of social media as a tool that augments protests is better understood by 
examining the research provided by Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni.17 The authors look at 
how mass uprisings have the potential to enact change and overthrow an authoritarian 
government. They look at why citizens protest and under what conditions they are 
successful in leading to regime change.18 The article also considers that organizing mass 
protests under a repressive government is more challenging because there are more risks 
involved and organizing and communication is limited or disjointed. According to this 
theory, there is a tipping point that must be met where citizens must feel that the prospect 
of winning is greater than the threat posed by a repressive government. The theory 
identifies that as more repression limits or deters protests, smaller acts of protests take on 
more significant meaning as they show weakness in the government and are more likely 
to cascade into larger events.  
Aspects of this theory are applicable to the situation in Bahrain and can be used to 
explain why organizers of seemingly small protests use social media to portray events to 
a larger audience in hopes of gaining broader support. This explanation also fits into the 
government’s application of harsher security tactics to protesters and use of social media 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 145. 
17 Ruth Kricheli, Yair Livne, and Beatriz Magaloni, “Taking to the Streets: Theory and Evidence on 
Protests under Authoritarianism,” in APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, (2011). 
18 Ibid., 2. 
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to portray actions from their viewpoint. Government sponsored Facebook pages and 
official information dissemination increased drastically in the years after 2011 in an 
attempt to offset what it considered a one-sided and often erroneous portrayal of events. 
Sectarian language and branding certain radical groups as terrorists also factor into this 
theory, as the government attempted to factionalize and minimize the opposition. Using 
communication to strengthen its position in a highly divided state has helped the 
government, in essence, to mobilize its own uprising of support to counter the protests. 
Bahrain has utilized the application of force to stop protests as documented in the 
BICI report. However, while a security presence is still felt across the country in 2015, it 
is much lower than the level seen in 2011. In light of this changing security presence, the 
online presence of protest movements has only grown in that same timeframe. The 
lessened security presence allowed protest organizations that grew in the free spaces of 
social media to expand into literal gatherings and face-to-face connections. Similar use of 
social media to organize and garner support can also be seen in the Eastern provinces of 
Saudi Arabia where conditions are similar to Bahrain.  
Neighboring Bahrain and sharing similar grievances, sectarian divides, and 
Internet penetration rates, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia witnessed an uprising and 
government use of force in response at the same time as the Bahrain uprising. During the 
Saudi uprising, various groups in Saudi began posting their activities online and showed a 
loose organization through 2011 and 2012. In March 2012, a coalition of youth 
movements united under a single structure called the Coalition of Freedom and Justice.19 
This unity mirrored a similar move in Bahrain when the February 14 movement assumed 
control over the online presence of multiple smaller protest groups. This social forum 
allowed for the loosely organized group to have a disciplined and focused format and a 
unified challenge to the government message but differed from Bahrain in that Saudi 
                                                 
19 Toby Matthiesen, “A” Saudi Spring?: The Shi’a Protest Movement in the Eastern Province 2011–
2012.” The Middle East Journal 66, no. 4 (2012): 628–59. 
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maintained their security presence and oppression of the population limiting the ability of 
protest organizations to grow.20 
The ability to organize and portray a unified presence online furthered the aims, 
as illustrated by Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni to portray a larger presence and attract 
more people to a cause while portraying the government in a weak position.21 In 
Bahrain’s case, what started as a loose organization of various groups turned into a 
political organization that challenged the government to brand them as terrorists.22 
How did the 14 February movement grow to a point that it became a key symbol 
for recruiting participants and organizing large events? Studies have shown a correlation 
between a diffuse network of people among multiple online networks and their 
relationship with leadership and their ability to recruit.23 These studies found that the 
speed that information moved between online organizations correlated with how the 
organizations were organized. When information was dispersed through multiple, smaller 
organizations versus few larger organizations, the speed of information drastically 
increased. Social media forums used by Bahrain’s protest organizations facilitated this 
type of information distribution. This would be one explanation to the success of the 
February movement as an organizer of multiple nodes of information associated amongst 
the other protest groups online. Fourteen February movement leaders were able to 
disseminate information to multiple smaller networks of people where the time needed to 
distribute information is much shorter. The ability to exchange information and ideas 
quickly allowed protesters to organize protests and direct protest activities in real time in 
an effort to counter police tactics. This use of information dissemination and its 
                                                 
20 T. C. Jones, and A. Al-Shehabi, “Bahrain’s Revolutionaries,” Middle East Channel on Foreign 
Policy, Communication 2 (2012). 
21 Ruth Kricheli, Yair Livne, and Beatriz Magaloni, “Taking to the Streets: Theory and Evidence on 
Protests under Authoritarianism,” in APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, (2011). 
22 Eman Ragab, “Challenges of Countering Terrorism in the Middle East after the Arab Revolutions,” 
in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism among Youth to Prevent Terrorism, ed. Lombardi, 
Marco, E. Ragab, Vivienne Chin, Y. Dandurand, Valerio de Divitiis, and Alessandro Burato, (Amsterdam: 
IOS Press, 2014), 107. 
23 Sandra González-Bailón, Javier Borge-Holthoefer, Alejandro Rivero, and Yamir Moreno. “The 
Dynamics of Protest Recruitment through an Online Network,” Scientific reports 1, (2011); Neal Caren, 
and Sarah Gaby, “Occupy Online: Facebook and the Spread of Occupy Wall Street,” Available at SSRN 
1943168 (2011). 
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application in Bahrain further aids this research in identifying the importance that social 
media plays to organize and express ideas in an environment where literal gathering and 
exchange of ideas is stifled by government oppression.  
3. Social Media Activism into Real-World Application 
The dynamics within the online networks also become important for 
understanding how online activism translates to real-world events. One study analyzing 
the use of Twitter identified distinct groups of people that disseminate information 
depending on the type of event.24 The first group had a high percentage of receiving and 
disseminating information internal to their network during ongoing events or breaking 
news stories. This group did not provide as much unique input, rather the individuals 
acted as a conduit to spread information resulting in a quick and high disbursement rate 
of the information. In the second group, individuals used Twitter as a medium to post 
their original comments on a mainstream media event such as an election or television 
event resulting in a smaller pattern of distribution but with more content. This second 
group, although timely, did not result in a wide distribution of information.25 This study 
further identifies the need for a broad organization of online social networks to distribute 
information quickly and effectively in order to organize events. Bahrain provides an 
example of this type of distribution network typified by multiple social networks in use 
by multiple protest groups able to quickly distribute information during the preparation 
and actual events as they unfolded. 
One final area of study compares online communication as opposed to traditional 
face-to-face meetings. Earl et al. argue that online activism does not necessarily spur 
increases in offline activism.26 They argue that trust and required face-to-face meetings 
are still essential to participation in protest activities while online activism is used to 
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25 Ibid., 104. 
26 Jennifer Earl, Katrina Kimport, Greg Prieto, Carly Rush, and Kimberly Reynoso, “Changing the 
World One Webpage at a Time: Conceptualizing and Explaining Internet Activism,” Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly 15, no. 4 (2010): 425–446. 
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spread information much like spreading pamphlets or brochures in a traditional setting.27 
Applying this study to Bahrain will help to understand if the protest networks in Bahrain 
are also information sharing networks or if the repressive atmosphere is forcing people to 
use the online format as free spaces to meet, discuss, and recruit to participate in mass 
protests. Bahrain’s use of social media supports this argument. Although social media 
was used to organize and direct protest activities, groups still met face to face to share 
ideas, recruit new members and organize activities. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Understanding the role that social media played in protest activities in Bahrain is 
a complex issue and encompasses a variety of factors. Sectarianism divides, economic 
disparities, and access to power, as well as government control of media and access to 
information pressure protest organizations and cause fractures within the Bahraini 
society. How social media is used to counter or utilize this pressure can be broken down 
into three different areas:  
 Is social media being used as a means of solely transmitting information or 
is it used to organize and mobilize the population? 
 Are government and larger protest organizations utilizing social media 
domains to further promote their agendas and shape outcomes? 
 Is social media changing social mobilization and creating a cleavage 
amongst the population or is it just another tool used to communicate and 
that does not affect the outcome?  
The first question aims to identify the manner in which organizations are using 
social media in Bahrain. Critical to this question is to identify how the organizations are 
structured and the interconnections they have between them. This thesis aims to use this 
information to chart how information is disseminated within and between these 
organizations and if the outcome leads to an increased organization in protests or simply 
an exchange of information and awareness. My hypothesis is that protest groups are 
seeing benefits in activation of protesters through social media in non-violent protests due 
to a repressive environment. My secondary hypothesis is that dominant youth groups 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 439. 
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used social media to broadcast their message to a larger international audience to increase 
pressure on the government, thereby changing the balance of risk described by Kricheli, 
Livne, and Magaloni.28 
The second area of focus is separate from the first in that not all entities in 
Bahrain are using social media to actively encourage people to demonstrate. My 
hypothesis is that the government and mainstream protest organizations such as Al Wefaq 
use social media as a means to educate and inform the population while causing further 
cleavages that advance their causes. 
The third area of focus of this thesis is to determine the effect that social media 
use is having on real change in the country or if it is irrelevant and change is already on 
the path to occur. My hypothesis is that although social media is encouraging activism 
and increasing the flow of information and timing of events, in the end, it is just another 
form of communication just like the telephone or fax machine when they were invented. 
The unique feature of social media is that it has the ability to impact countless people in a 
relative short period of time, which at times appears to spur change. In essence, it just 
compresses an already determined timeline based on prior grievances, social inequalities, 
and economic opportunities. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis compares the Bahrain protest movements prior to the 2011 Arab 
Spring uprising to the protest movements after 2011 and up to the current time using a 
comparative framework. Specifically, this thesis evaluates how the use of social media 
altered the course of these movements and the significance of the changes. By analyzing 
the increased use of social media and its effects allows for a comparison of these two 
time periods.  
Bahrain is an excellent case to study the effects of social media in protests 
movements as the country has a long history of protests and a high Internet penetration of 
the population. Protest organizations and the government both credit the use of social 
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media as a factor affecting the current situation. Additionally, other protest movements in 
the region are using the Bahraini model of social media use as a template to further their 
causes.  
This thesis avails itself to multiple books and articles, which outline and evaluate 
the history of protest movements in Bahrain and in the Gulf region. Fewer choices in 
sources and information exist that specifically relate to the use of social media in recent 
protest organizations and events. For this reason, this thesis includes primary sources, the 
use of Internet data-mining from the time period and an evaluation of Twitter and 
Facebook trends from both the protest movements and the government. 
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II. AN AUTHORITARIAN STATE AND ITS HISTORY OF 
PROTEST 
Bahrain has a long history of protest. During events of the Arab Spring, state run 
daily media reports focused solely on the violence, placing blame on Shia youth. 
Residents of the country including foreign workers, worried about driving their children 
to school or if the roads would be blocked by protesters that evening when it was time to 
run errands. The violence in Bahrain is far more complex than is characterized in the 
media and even by the average person living in the country. A history of protests under 
an authoritarian rule had changed during the Arab spring. Government actions no longer 
appeared sufficient to contain protests and the ensuing violence and protesters ability to 
coordinate and engage security forces strengthened every day. Social media use was 
pervasive throughout the protests and enabled free spaces outside of government control 
where communication thrived and spread to the people. 
A. A DIVIDED COUNTRY 
Currently, Bahrain is in the midst of a sectarian conflict that includes a wide range 
of activities. Government authorized peaceful demonstrations, by pro-government groups 
as well as by those groups wanting reforms, occurs on a daily basis as do violent protests 
both intertwined with and separate from peaceful rallies. Terrorist acts and riots by 
various mainly Shia youth groups occur sporadically, aimed mainly at security forces but 
at times affect the civilian communities. Gatherings and protests can no longer be taken 
for their intended purpose. Groups aiming for violence can easily use peaceful 
demonstrations as cover for more nefarious actions. For instance, on 3 March a 
government sanctioned funeral procession was interrupted by a group of protesters 
breaking away from the main procession, prompting police to use tear gas and bird shot 
to contain the violence. The event ended as a bomb placed by the rioters erupted and 
killed three officers.29  
                                                 
29“Bomb Blast Kills Three Bahrain Policemen” BBC New, 4 November 2014, 
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Because of the ongoing violence, the government purposefully deploys its 
security forces in order to isolate and contain the violence and to minimize disruption of 
daily patterns of life for citizens. Although violence occurs daily in Bahrain, it is 
localized in mainly Shia neighborhoods and targeted between Sunni government security 
forces and the Shia protesters. The majority of the Sunni and Shia communities as well as 
the ex-patriates working on the island feels its effects, but is normally not subjected to 
direct violence. The unique opportunity to watch a Gulf country go through sectarian 
conflict post-Arab Spring offered an insight into why this conflict endured and evolved 
and how a history of sectarian tension and violence aided what has become a daily battle 
for survival and struggle for power among its population. 
Why is there sectarian conflict in Bahrain and what are the causal factors for the 
increasing violence and instability in the society? Bahrain has endured decades of 
sectarian violence that initially spiked in the mid-1990s and is currently experiencing a 
second spike, which appears to become part of a routine pattern of life. This chapter 
examines this question of violence and instability and identifies the reasons that produce 
and shape this conflict: the history of the sectarian conflict, the actions of key actors in 
the conflict, and external pressures. Although there are various sectarian cleavages, this 
conflict is also rooted in power and economic advantages that are used to further both the 
cause of the state as well as the opposition groups.  
B. HISTORY AND THE CONFLICT 
The Kingdom of Bahrain is an island nation comprising over 30 separate islands 
15 miles from the eastern coast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.30 The majority of the 
population is located in the northern half of the main island of Bahrain and the two 
connecting islands of Muharraq and Sitra. The population is mainly urbanized as the 
island is only approximately 10 miles wide and 30 miles long.31 Although Bahrain has 
historically been home to the agricultural production of dates, land reclamation in recent 
                                                 
30 Fred Haley Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 
1989), 1. 
31 Ibid., 1. 
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decades has decimated natural fresh water sources damaging agricultural production and 
opportunities.32 The southern half of the island is mainly uninhabited and is crisscrossed 
with pipelines for natural gas and oil production.  
Identifying the sectarian makeup of the country is difficult as the government 
discourages official censuses that distinguish between Sunni and Shia. The current 
population of Bahrain is just over 1.3 million with only 45 percent of that number 
comprising local Bahrainis. The remaining population of the country is made up of 
expatriate workers, the majority of which are of South Asian descent.33 The non-native 
residents in Bahrain largely do not play a direct role in the ongoing sectarian conflict. 
Although the expat residents do not play a large or direct role, their governments and the 
pressure they exert do influence the behavior of the Bahraini government as well as 
opposition groups. 
Current estimates identify that the religion of Islam is practiced by close to 70 
percent of the total population. Within Islam, the population is divided between Sunni 
and Shia with the wide-held belief that the Shia carry the majority, with some estimates 
up to two-thirds of the indigenous population. The remaining religions in Bahrain reflect 
the varied demographics, with more than 14 percent Christian, almost 10 percent Hindu 
and a variety of others.34 Unlike its neighbor Saudi Arabia that strictly forbids other 
religions to meet and routinely raids and arrests Christian groups that are meeting in 
secret, Bahrain allows and regulates non-Islamic religious communities in their country. 
Bahrain is considered amongst expat workers in the region to be more western and 
unique among the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in that Bahraini law 
is more tolerant and amenable to other religions. As an example, churches, synagogues, 
Hindu and Buddhist temples, and other religious buildings can be found, and their 
worship services are open to the public. The Bahraini government does stipulate that 
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there is no proselytizing to the Muslim population and the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
strictly enforces the rules.  
A main point of contention between Sunni and Shia in Bahrain is the fact that the 
governing Sunni family does not represent the majority Shia population, which is 
considered one of the primary reasons why the state does not allow official designation of 
Shia and Sunni. , The government of Bahrain has not conducted an official census that 
distinguishes between Sunni and Shia since 1941 when it was found that nearly 53 
percent of the population was Shia. Some of the claims by those seeking political reform 
include prejudicial treatment in hiring for major positions of power within the 
government and security sectors. In terms of citizenship, while the state offers citizenship 
through birth only to Bahraini citizens, the government has since offered citizenship to 
some Sunnis brought into the country to work, especially in the security sector.35 This 
practice has been highly criticized by the Shia community as an overt attempt to 
minimize the Shia Bahraini population over the years but the practice continues. 
According to leaders within the Shia community, the lack of official clarity and practice 
of encouraging an influx of Sunni population allowed the government to maintain official 
claims of legitimacy that Sunnis are the majority while dismissing claims by the Shia 
oppositions.  
Historically, protests are woven into the social fabric of the Bahrain society. As 
an example, under the British colonial rule, Bahrain experienced protest activities and a 
call to end colonialism in the 1940s and 1950s. Economic changes that resulted in a rise 
in a middle class of entrepreneurs and oil wealth along with a nationalistic movement 
fueled the protests among the Bahrainis. These protests aimed to end colonialization and 
end a British push to consolidate Bahrain with the other sheikdoms of the region that 
included what is now known as UAE, Qatar and Oman. These early protests were 
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categorized as unorganized and were brutally put down by the ruling British power that 
also included revoking the citizenships of people associated with the protests.36 
After Bahrain gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1971, they 
entered an era of prosperity caused by an oil boom. Recounting this time in their history, 
many Sunni leaders and Shia activists talk of an economic growth that benefited both 
sides with relatively little tension. As the oil boom slowed during the 1980s due to 
international market prices, the economic disparity between Shia and Sunni communities 
became more apparent.37 Protests against social injustices and a lack of Shia participation 
in the government increased. During the 1990s, the new Emir (and current King) 
assumed his position of power with promises of reform. On 14 February 2002, the state 
of Bahrain officially became the Kingdom of Bahrain with the Emir assuming the title of 
King. This marked a renewed peace in Bahrain with the hope of future inclusion of the 
Shia community in the government. The King enacted laws that allowed an elected 
parliament to form. In response to this new legislation, Shia leaders called for protests to 
end in hopes of more inclusion. The pause in protests was short lived as the instituted 
reforms were quickly identified as a token with no real power being given to parliament 
members. By the end of the 2000s, Shia opposition leaders were calling for renewed 
protests against the government. This renewed protest and eventual call for violence 
exemplifies the assertions of David Lake and Donald Rothchild that “intense sectarian 
conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future.”38 Just as the renewed hope 
of inclusion that the new Emir instituted in 1999 brought a steep decline in violence and 
protest, it appears that repression after the Arab Spring inspired calls for renewed protests 
and violence. 
In addition to a sectarian divide within the kingdom, there was a growing divide 
within the Sunni communities. Power within the authoritarian government was strictly 
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controlled and limited in scope to those close to and loyal to the ruling family. With the 
consolidation of power within the Khalifa family and those tribal families close to them, 
the Sunni community was divided into two main parts. This division included those 
thought to take a hardline approach, including members of the royal court and the 
commander of the Defense Force, in dealing with protesters, and a more moderate group 
that included the Crown Prince that espoused ideas of inclusion and reform.39 This divide 
was apparent in the protests in 2011. The violence of the initial protests coupled with 
sectarian rhetoric by the government and protesters as well as the security crackdown that 
ensued appeared to fracture this alliance between sects. 
C. PROTEST AND CRIES FOR CHANGE 
The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2011 offered a catalyst for the 
protesters in Bahrain to mobilize and highlight their fight in the international media. In 
early 2011, Bahraini protesters, both Sunni and Shia congregated at the Pearl Roundabout 
and started an encampment, blocking traffic and demanding to be heard by the 
government. Large-scale protests were occurring throughout the country by both pro and 
anti-government forces, which led to the GCC sending Saudi led forces into Bahrain to 
assist in securing the country and re-establishing the rule of law. On 14 February, the 
government responded to the protesters at the largest site of demonstration at the Pearl 
Roundabout resulting in multiple deaths and injuries and accusations by the international 
community of human rights abuses.40 This day then marked a rallying cry for opposition 
groups as a reminder of the brutal tactics that the government used to repress and 
subjugate the people. Since 2011, Bahrain has seen an increase in protests and violence 
aimed at security forces and a change in the demands of opposition leaders. What was 
initially a call for a more democratic government process, more inclusion of the Shia 
population in government and to abide by previously voted on measures from the 2002 
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election changed to calls for the removal of the Sunni-led government and King’s family, 
the Khalifas, from rule.  
D. IMPACT OF COLONIALISM 
Taken from this history and applied to the current conflict, there are multiple 
underlying factors contributing to the protests and violence. Colonialism can be credited 
with a drastic rise in institutional organization in Bahrain, establishing a Sunni led 
government and setting the stage for future sectarian conflicts. Prior to colonialism, 
Bahrain was considered a nomadic and tribal region that was embroiled in constant 
battling with regional neighbors. Even during the Khalifas’ rule spanning 130 years until 
1861 when colonialism began, Bahrain constantly battled and were threatened by the 
main regional actors including the Ottoman empire and Iran, providing little peace or 
stability to the country.41  
Under colonialism, a political and social stability settled on the island 
comparative to their previous history although this stability came with a price. The 
establishment of colonialism was brutal in its own right and instituted a ruling system that 
entrenched power of the Khalifa family. With the support of the colonial powers, reduced 
security fears from outside threats and family rivalries in the region, the Khalifa family 
became the dominant elite under British rule. The Khalifa family used this authority to 
insert members of their family and close Sunni allies in key political posts that benefited 
from the economic boom of oil and trade that would come in the next century. Although 
colonialism brought a semblance of stability to the country within the region, internal 
sectarian cleavages were only further divided by the ruling elite.  
With external threats minimized, the Khalifa family focused inward to strengthen 
their claim on rule. With the support of colonial advisors, opposition members were 
deported or ordered to leave the country diminishing threats to the Khalifa family rule.42 
By the 1950s, the Al Khalifas “occupied a predominant position within the country’s 
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political and economic affairs. Economic wealth increased at this time from the growing 
oil industry controlled by the government while traditional means of wealth in the pearl 
trade diminished.43 These changes in the economic wealth of the state versus the ability 
of the people to share directly in the wealth contributed to further divisions within the 
community. Although these divisions were not wholly sectarian, they were a contributing 
factor to future sectarian divides and conflicts. 
Over time, British rule was challenged internal from the country with increased 
protests and violence. These protests and call for reform harbored desires for self-rule by 
the Bahrainis without any foreign governance. When colonialism ended in 1971, the 
Khalifas and Sunni allies were positioned to quickly assume control with an organization 
of governance that allowed for a stable and secure transition. While dominating the 
political power, the ruling family allowed for merchants to gain economically although 
with state controls in place. In essence, merchants were allowed the potential for 
increased wealth albeit under the control of the Khalifas. This agreement benefitted both 
the political and merchant class in the country reducing potential for future conflicts 
between them.44 Although this system did not allow for an inclusive government, the 
system allowed a strong central government while maintaining the ability for the 
populace to enjoy economic benefits or a thriving merchant class. 
At the end of the colonial era, Bahrain worked to strengthen and unify the 
country. Government policies to include the populace voice were enacted by rarely used. 
Hope for a stronger nationalistic unity was fleeting as one power was replaced with 
another authoritarian power that was reluctant to share power in a growing economic 
boom based in oil. The new sovereign government was soon to find out that the 
establishment of organized protest movements against colonial powers had the capability 
fixate solely on the new government with minimal help from external support. 
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E. NAVIGATING EXTERNAL SECURITY NEEDS AND DOMESTIC 
STRIFE 
After Bahrain became an independent nation in 1971, the government moved 
quickly to ally with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, their closest and strongest Sunni ally 
in the region, and the United States in order to strengthen their external defensive 
security.45 As a function of the alliance with Kuwait and the other Gulf countries, Iraqi 
aggression was a critical cause for concern. The threat from Iraq presented the issue of an 
Iraqi Sunni government against other regional Sunni governments. The security threat 
posed by Iraq worked to unify Bahrain along with its allies against their aggression. 
Compared to Iraq, Iran posed a separate and unique challenge. This threat included a 
sectarian issue that was only exacerbated in 1979 by renewed Iranian threats that Bahrain 
belonged to Iran. This potential sectarian divide was cause for further protests in Bahrain 
and division between the government and their Shia population. Government statements 
blaming Iranian support for Shia protests were meant to isolate and contain the protesters 
and coupled with strict security procedures appeared to contain the violence and protests. 
This policy of sectarian statements, mass arrests, deportations and security policy of 
isolate and contain would again be seen after the initial Arab Spring uprising in the 
country. 
Bahrain looks to the United States and Saudi Arabia for external security support. 
The regional dynamic of Iran’s influence in direct challenge to a Sunni rule in the Gulf 
contributed greatly to Bahrain’s position in the conflict. This challenge increased the 
relationship between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia while allowing Bahrain to work out 
procedures to contain an internal sectarian based challenge to the government. The 
alliance with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries that began at this time formed the 
basis for future military cooperation and the formation of the Peninsula Shield Force. 
This force would eventually be deployed after the events of 2011 to help Bahrain 
suppress and contain protests and violence that ensued after the Arab Spring began. 
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Bahrain quickly became a proxy local conflict in the regional conflict between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran after 2011.46  Iranian leaders criticize Bahrain of atrocities against 
a Shia population desiring a political future of their own. Bahrain routinely criticized Iran 
of meddling in internal politics and points to multiple cases of Shia protesters confessing 
to receiving militant training by Iranian proxies in the region. Citing a recent smuggling 
incident linked to Iran, Bahrain government officials are convinced that Iran is directly 
aiding Shia activists to overthrow the Khalifa regime.47  Since the formation of the 
country, security fears of outside influence heavily influenced the anti-Shia and sectarian 
rhetoric of the government, and appear to heavily influence the tactics employed to 
suppress protests.  
The United States influence in Bahrain cannot be discounted. The majority of 
Bahrain’s military equipment and training support is U.S. provided. Additionally, the 
location of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain provides a layer of external defensive 
security allowing Bahrain to focus on internal security. The strength of the U.S. support 
and basing of regional naval operations in Bahrain is a deterrent for external aggression 
against the country. Maintaining influence and alliance with the U.S. has arguably shaped 
the dynamics of Bahrain. As a result of the historical U.S. presence and support in 
Bahrain, the loss of U.S. support has the potential to change the balance of power 
between not only Bahrain and Iran but also Bahrain’s dependency on Saudi Arabia and 
the other Gulf countries. The U.S. influence may not control the government’s actions but 
do affect the policies and procedures of the government.48  
F. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
Bahraini social and political structure is highly diverse with multiple layers of 
engagements that go beyond solely characterizing the current conflict solely as a 
sectarian issue. Using elements of Harff and Gurr’s framework, the current conflict can 
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be further understood along the following dynamics: discrimination, group cohesion, 
political environment, use of violence, external support, and international economic 
status.49 These dynamics help to isolate some of the characteristics effecting the current 
violence and crisis occurring in Bahrain. 
1. Discrimination 
The description of discrimination directly correlates with the Bahrain conflict. 
Indicators of discrimination include “government policies that treat sectarian groups 
unequally … that give some groups persistent advantages over others.”50 The Sunni-
dominated government of Bahrain is plagued with accusations of discrimination. Since 
2011, multiple Shia professors, doctors and other professionals were fired from their 
positions for their roles in the protests.51 Judicial punishments are perceived by Shia as 
being lenient on Sunni offenders with little to no accountability of the security forces.52 
Government policy and sectarian divided politics restrict the ability of Shias to gain 
positions of authority in the Bahraini government, which directs all major political and 
economic functions of the country.  
Shia youth generally feel that they do not have the same economic opportunities 
for the higher-paying government positions that the Sunni youth have access to.53 While 
all Bahrainis have access to the government funded University of Bahrain, government 
and military officials have additional access to government funded foreign educations 
and advanced degrees. Through discrimination of placing Sunnis in government and 
military positions, the secondary effect of limited educational opportunities to the Shia 
population then becomes a point of future grievances and divisions within the society. 
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2. Group Cohesion 
The strength that a group identifies itself varies depending on the number of 
shared traits.54 All residents of Bahrain share a common language of Arabic, although the 
schools teach English which the youth commonly use in the streets. Religion is the main 
trait that separates the two groups and has been used by both sides to cause further 
divisions. Although Shia protesters are not calling for Sharia law, they do want a 
revolutionary approach to change in government. Because religion, which is viewed at a 
primordial level by the people, is used as a discriminator, the assessment of group 
identity and the potential for future conflict remains at high risk. 
Group cohesion, along both sides of the conflict, runs high. A majority of the 
Sunni Bahrainis follows the King and ruling Khalifa family religiously with little 
tolerance for discussions that demean or contradict the King. Khalifa family members are 
royalty and are, therefore, top of the social order. Close relations to the Khalifa family 
determine the pecking order of the social status. As previously discussed, the Sunni 
community is not without its own divides. Even within the ruling family, there are hard 
line and moderate factions. The King and Prime Minister are generally considered to 
represent the hard line factions while the younger Crown Prince represents a more 
moderate approach to governance.  
Shia families on the contrary maintain a separate class order. Elite Shia families 
own trade and merchant companies that have close ties with but are maintained separate 
from government officials. The remainder of Shia is generally considered part of the 
working class and lower income. Since 2011, Shia protesters have looked more to protest 
leaders including Ali Salman and the leadership of the Al Wefaq association as the new 
social order and leadership. Younger protesters, frustrated with the restricted practices of 
the Shia leadership, have recently shown to factionalize and start new, more violent 
protest groups. Most Shia communities now have a small, organized Shia violent protest 
group that claims responsibility for conflict that occurs in their area. Although there is no 
overarching leadership visible for all these groups, Iranian influence is visible in 
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increased Iranian flags being flown in Shia villages and pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini 
being used in mosques and Shia neighborhoods.  
The ruling Khalifa family has placed direct members of their family in more than 
half of the powerful government positions.55 The King has direct control over all affairs 
of the Kingdom that is considered an autocracy. The only elected assembly where Shia 
leaders can participate in the country is the Parliament whose powers to enact legislative 
change are minimal and must be reviewed by the King to be enacted. Shia tribal leaders 
are largely excluded from government power positions.  
The political environment in Bahrain is currently not conducive to bridging the 
sectarian divide, freedom of speech or sharing of power compared to western societies. 
Shia activists accuse Bahrain of limiting their ability to protest and freedom of speech. 
Recent examples include arrests made of Shia activists for nothing more than speaking 
out against the king.56 Political parties against the government are severely restricted or 
banned outright. Foreign embassies in Bahrain are required to notify the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs when they meet with non-government political societies.57  All political 
power is strictly held at the highest levels of the ruling government with the king 
maintaining his position as final executive power.  
3. Use of Violence 
The widespread use of violence in response to protest activities is currently a 
debated subject between the Sunni and Shia communities in Bahrain. After the actions at 
the Pearl Roundabout in 2011, the king called for an independent counsel to review and 
provide an assessment of the human rights allegations and actions taken by the 
government. This counsel and its recommendations is what constitute the Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report. This report details the allegations of 
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violence that occurred and identifies parties on both sides of the conflict responsible for 
the violence. Both sides have accepted the findings of this report that indicate that the 
government did use brutal tactics including torture and executions, discrimination and 
mass arrests.58 Since that time, the Ministry of Interior has undergone a transformation 
taking steps to reform the force and put them in line with international standards of 
norms. Although there continues to be allegations of abuse and torture by Shia protesters, 
either the government has refuted each charge with videotaped evidence or charged guilty 
parties within the security force in order to be more transparent. Additionally, an 
increased media spotlight has covered Bahrain since 2011 highlighting the grievances of 
the Shia community against the government.  
4. External Support 
External support for the Sunni community is open among the GCC partners. The 
clear intent of this support is to maintain a Sunni rule in Bahrain. Shia support comes in 
the form of finance, arms, and training, which has been hard for the government of 
Bahrain to identify. Multiple caches of weapons and explosives have been found and as 
previously cited, a weapons shipment from Iran was confiscated as recently as December 
2013. Shia activists that have been found guilty of terrorist acts including bombings have 
confessed to training with Iranian military and supported groups.59 Sunni government 
officials consistently accused Iran of meddling in internal politics for decades with little 
proof. These accusations have only further separated the Shia population but also caused 
a “credibility gap”60 that has to be addressed in any future accusations to be deemed 
credible.  
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5. International Economic Status 
As previously discussed, the government and politics are mainly Sunni controlled 
which includes control of the oil sector. After the discovery of oil and the end of 
colonialism, Bahrain became a rentier state with oil revenues enabling the government to 
control the population and assert control by the Khalifa family. Initially, this system 
worked well to unite the people and offered great economic growth to the country. As 
time passed, the Shia population saw the Sunni dominated government controlling the 
wealth with little input or future prospects of input from the Shia community. 
Understanding that economic discrimination along sectarian and class lines lead to 
increased violence and conflict in societies help identify goals and intent in Bahrain 
society.61 As the disparity between the general people, mostly made up of Shia, and the 
ruling elite, which were Sunni, became wider, the grievances of relative wealth between 
these two groups continue to be a growing source for protests.  
Bahrain is relatively resource poor compared to neighboring GCC countries but 
still maintains the oil revenue that fund the country. Bahrain’s oil reserves are quickly 
coming to an end and Bahrain is working to diversify their assets to compensate. 
Becoming a financial hub is one method that they are working to mitigate this risk. 
Additionally, Bahrain is a tourist destination for GCC members (mainly Saudi Arabia) 
that want a break from their repressive environments. Aluminum refining and gas 
refining are additional areas that Bahrain is investing in for future economic development 
and sustainability of the Sunni ruling authority. In total, Bahrain’s economic status is not 
what it used to be and the future does not look as optimistic due to continued unrest and 
withering oil reserves.  
G. TRIGGERS FOR PROTEST 
Although Bahrain has seen several sustained sectarian conflicts throughout their 
history, the early 2011 episode had several triggers that are distinct from the previous 
conflicts. Prior to 2011, Bahrain was already undergoing political changes. Sectarian 
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divides and rhetoric from the Sunni leadership and Shia activists worked to divide the 
people. International divisions with regional alignment between Sunni dominated Gulf 
bloc and a perceived Shia Iranian meddling and aggression also furthered this divide. 
Economic and political opportunities and motivations played a large part in protest 
movements as inclusion in the government affairs directly related to increased 
opportunities. Government responses and actions were additional triggers for protest.  
H. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
In conjunction with strict security measures, the ability to disrupt free spaces and 
control over the media while targeting and denying protest leadership, the government 
historically managed and mitigated protests movements. The government use of force, 
mass arrests and harassment have worked to disrupt protest activities in the past.62 Police 
tactics to isolate and contain the protesters then deny them the ability to meet and 
congregate were routinely used with success. Regular protests were present but with the 
lower levels of sustained violence. Large scale and enduring protests that were seen in 
early 2011 did not happen previously, as the people were unable to maintain or increase 
the required level of mobilization. With little recourse against government oppression, 
protests could be managed. 
In addition to identifying the need to isolate and contain protests and identify and 
arrest and harass protest leadership, changes in government policy reflect that religious 
gatherings needed to be monitored as well. In 1996, the government enacted laws that 
controlled the appointment of both Sunni and Shia clerics as well as controlling funding 
and religious educational opportunities.63 Just as the use of force limited the people’s 
ability to meet, the tactic of controlling their religious affairs further denied them a 
location to organize and sustain a mobilization. 
Control of media both domestic and international played a key role in the ability 
of the government to suppress and manage internal protest activities. By controlling the 
                                                 




message to the people and limiting the ability of protesters to share their message, the 
government held control over public perception of events. The opportunity to voice 
grievances to a large audience was limited and hampered efforts to mobilize and gain 
widespread support. Media was a third area or space that was denied through government 
actions. 
Using their control of the media, Bahrain has historically used sectarian rhetoric 
to characterize opposition as illegal and un-loyal to the country. This tactic to divide 
protesters from society and control their actions aimed to deny opposition movements to 
merge and grow.64 With government control of media, opposition viewpoints and 
messaging were lost. Control of the message left the government able to respond with 
little recourse from its allies or the international community at large.  
I. PREPARING FOR CHANGE 
Bahrain’s conflict can be described using David Lake and Donald Rothchild’s 
theory of ethnic conflict.65 There are multiple causes and catalysts for state weakening 
that increased the chances of mobilization and conflict in this case. In this theory, elite 
are important but not essential to the conflict, as the state has to weaken in order for the 
conflict to occur. In Bahrain’s case, elite on both sides contributed to the conflict but only 
after the causes and catalysts occurred did the current conflict erupt. 
There are three causes that attributed to the conflict in Bahrain: information 
failure, credible commitment, and the security dilemma. Multiple communication failures 
between sides occurred during this conflict with the government using sectarian language 
to describe an initial political movement. In response, Shia leaders characterized 
government security responses as solely sectarian motivated prompting an increased 
security dilemma. Both sides of the conflict had incentives to misrepresent greatly 
decreasing compromise. 
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Increased information failures coupled with a growing credible commitment 
increased the mobilization of groups while decreasing checks and balances. As Bahrain 
failed in their commitment to uphold laws that would enable a stronger Shia 
representation and political power, the Shia communities became increasingly bitter and 
disenfranchised with the process. No longer were they interested in dialogue with the 
government and inclined to pre-emptive strikes against them as protest activities were 
only met with violence. As sectarianism was stoked through government statements, 
Sunni leaders within the government used this opportunity to destroy suspected and 
illegally built Shia mosques. All combined, these failures and decisions increased fear 
and incentives to strike violently in conflict. As other avenues of communication and 
politics closed, violence on the streets grew exponentially. Only after dialogues resumed 
in early 2013 did violence decrease. 
As explained by Lake and Rothchild, the catalysts of sectarian activism and 
political entrepreneurs led to the conflict in Bahrain. Bahrain was previously a mixed 
society with intermarriages and business relationships between sects. After 2011, these 
relationships were strained to the point of broken in many cases. Because of the sectarian 
language used by both sides during the initial conflict, the community became divided 
along sectarian lines. Political entrepreneurs fueled this language to promote their 
agenda. As the state weakened, these Shia elite and entrepreneurs identified an 
opportunity to further their cause with a polarized mobilization of the masses. Sunni elite 
capitalized on polarizing Bahrainis to support security measures to restrict movements of 
the Shia communities and repressive tactics of arrests and discrimination. As the 
polarization of the sectarian communities increased, so did the conflict. In this case, the 
elite capitalized on the situations enhancing their positions as the state weakened. 
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III. SOCIAL MEDIA—POWER TO THE PEOPLE—2011-2013 
A. FREE SPACES 
Unlike the other Gulf countries, Bahrain is a small, self-contained island with a 
history of protests and grievances against a minority ruling family. At 96.5 percent, it has 
the third highest Internet penetration rate of all 198 countries in this year’s ranking.66 
Additionally, there are on average nearly 1.7 mobile phone subscriptions per person on 
the island.67  Between the Internet penetration rate and use of smart phones, the 
possibility for social media’s impact is greatly enhanced. Because of these circumstances, 
Bahrain is a unique and interesting case study for social media.  
The use of social media as a public or free space was not a new idea in 2011. 
Jeffrey Juris wrote of the use of social media in 2010 in regard to the 
#Occupyeverywhere movement in that it was a “confluence between network norms, 
forms, and technologies ... that, as new media were incorporated into the ongoing 
practices of core groups of activists, they helped diffuse new dynamics of activism.”68 
The use of social media invigorated the dynamics of activism by offering an alternate 
path to disseminate information and ideas outside the reach of governments and 
organizations attempting to stop or minimize the growth of the movements. In 2011, the 
use of social media in Bahrain opened doors to activists and protesters that were quickly 
closing due to government security actions. The success of the government tactics of 
repression and denying groups the ability to meet, were quickly overshadowed by the 
protester’s abilities to communicate and organize through social media. Protest activities 
did not diminish, as had been the case in the 1990s during a similar instance of violence 
and mass mobilization, rather protest activities grew. Just as Juris previously noted, the 
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incorporation of social media into an ongoing conflict changed the manner of the 
activism and subsequently the output and consequences. 
Protesters used social media as a new free space to organize and disseminate 
information. More people joined ongoing protests as they were able to instantly see 
mobilization occurring. In essence, the prospect of violence and threshold to join were 
lowered as mass mobilizations occurred and social media outlets were used to portray the 
government as lacking the capability to control them. The ability to communicate and 
exchange information was critical to the success of the large scale mass mobilizations 
that protesters were able to achieve despite government restrictions and controls. Social 
media became the manner in which protesters used to mobilize as opposed to the 
traditional manner of word of mouth or organized rallies. In support of this type of 
information exchange through social media use, a study by Jeanette Sutton et al. on the 
effectiveness of communication through social media during disaster management 
showed that “social media supports backchannel communication, allowing for wide-scale 
interaction between members of the public that cannot otherwise be easily obtained.”69  
Government tactics of repression no longer had the same effectiveness and the 
government was caught unprepared for the continued violence and mass protests. In 
response, government repression grew, prompting the need for external support from the 
Peninsula Shield Force and an increased presence of security forces on the street. The 
increased security and repression only deepened the divide between protesters and pro-
government forces. While combatting protests and street violence with the threat of 
increased state security, harsh judicial rulings, and sectarian rhetoric, the government laid 
the foundation for an atmosphere of spiraling violence.70 Only later did the government 
realize their disadvantage and change security tactics to incorporate the use of social 
media in their campaign. This use of social media as a free space became the new 
battleground for an ever-increasing conflict that still endures.  
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B. TRADITIONAL VIEW OF PROTESTS 
As history shows, generations of Bahrainis have lived with protest for a long time. 
A distinction must be made at this point between protesters and their supporters and those 
who commit acts of violence or terrorism, attempting to make change in the name of 
protest. While not discounting these acts of violence, which are facilitated by ongoing 
protest activities, this study looks at how social media impacts the ability of protesters to 
mobilize. This study makes the assumption that individuals that radicalized and used 
violence as a means to effect change were more reliant on face to face communication to 
mobilize and recruit versus those that mobilized in support of legitimate protest activities. 
This assumption is based on continued police investigations that identified traditional 
methods of communication amongst violent protesters. These investigations identified 
that social media was used as a tool to coordinate attacks but not for recruiting, training, 
and organizing violent attacks. Only after attacks were planned was social media used to 
coordinate the timing with other violent protest groups. 
C. INITIAL ORGANIZATION EFFORTS AND GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES 
1. Protesters 
Bahrain protesters and mobilizers were quick to act after Egypt’s Tahrir Square 
incident that brought about the change in Egypt’s political structure. The Arab Spring in 
other parts of the region is credited as being a tool for mobilizing the masses and 
providing a template to enact policy and government changes. Although, there are 
fundamental differences between Bahrain, Egypt and the other Arab Spring countries that 
will not be discussed in this paper, at its core the Bahraini people were motivated by 
these regional acts along with the other mobilizations and conflicts occurring at that time. 
The examples set by protesters in Egypt and Tunisia of increased information flow to 
organize events and disseminate information set the stage for the rapid growth of protests 
in Bahrain. 
By 2011, grievances and sympathies for protests and calls for reform were well 
ingrained within the Bahraini culture. Social networks were already formed and 
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interconnected online. Recruitment and influencing people to protest was made easier by 
actions within the region. Through social media, Bahraini protesters witnessed changes in 
governments occur quickly offering the needed ingredient of hope to encourage 
participation. Historic grievances along with hope for real change were essential and 
allowed protest leaders to use social media as a means to inform and mobilize the masses 
quickly.  
Previous to 2011, traditional protests included marches and demonstrations that 
blocked roads and disrupted traffic. The event would be announced well in advance 
allowing people to gather and participate. Normally, this type of announcement occurred 
in mosques or through informal networks of friends. Weekly rallies and events were 
established and local communities were generally alerted prior to the event. In all, the 
process and speed of information flow was lengthy and slow with multiple points within 
the process that could be disrupted. 
In early 2011, social media was used as a vehicle to mobilize a population that 
already had deep social and economic divides within the society rather than actually 
deepening the divide. Once the Arab Spring began in the region, images of large 
gatherings and overwhelmed police forces soon spread amongst the Bahraini public. This 
information demonstrated to the Bahraini public the power of mass demonstration and 
ability to garner public and international support. The threshold to join a demonstration 
was lowered, as the movement of reform was no longer isolated to Bahrain solely but 
rather part of a broader regional effort. 
The use of social media additionally allowed for immediate interaction between 
diverse groups of participants. Circles of friends and acquaintances could quickly be 
linked and accessed through social media that traditionally would have taken an 
inordinate amount of time. The shortening in time that social media allowed in organizing 
and establishing connections between groups allowed for diverse groups to share ideas 
and identify commonalities between groups that they were previously unable to do in the 
same time frame. This shortened time span allowed for faster mobilizations to occur 
increasing the participation in protests in early 2011. 
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2. Government 
Government officials in Bahrain were not prepared for the rapid rise in protest 
activities nor the encampment that sprung up overnight at the Pearl Roundabout in the 
center of the financial district and close to major government palaces and buildings. Just 
as the political changes that occurred in the region were one trigger for increased activism 
and mobilization to the conflict, the government response was a second trigger with much 
greater implications in my assessment. After 14 February 2011 government security 
forces responded with force.71 This excessive force and subsequent raids in Shia 
dominated areas of the country along with arrests and up to a reported 30 deaths that 
occurred at this time unified the Shia population in a way that had never before been seen 
in Bahrain.  
a. Security Forces 
In response to protest activities, initial security forces tactics were designed 
around isolating and containing protesters. This tactic worked to allow a sense of freedom 
of speech for protesters while also limiting the scope of the protest activities and impact 
on normal daily activities of other citizens. As soon as protest activities became violent or 
started to move into areas that impeded traffic or considered off limits, security forces 
would step in to stop the protest, at times forcefully. Mass arrests, use of excessive tear 
gas, and excessive use of force were common accusations of these security responses.72 
This tactic was based on years of experience that demonstrated the power of the 
government as a show of force. In previous times, prospective protesters were weary of 
joining a protest when they perceived that security forces could arrest, imprison or cause 
physical harm without impunity during the protest. Traditionally, this type of reaction 
was enough to deter future demonstrations and limit participation in protests. In this 
instance, instead of slowing the protests gaining the initiative, protesters continued to 
gather in larger numbers.  
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One of the key problems with this type of response was that it was reactive in 
nature and thereby was time and labor intensive. As witnessed in early 2011, the Bahrain 
security forces were quickly overwhelmed and unable to contain the growing violence. 
Security forces were consistently deployed throughout the island and always on a high 
state of alert. For short periods of time, this type of readiness could be sustained, but as 
the protests continued, the security forces quickly were unable to respond adequately.73 It 
was at this time that the Bahrain Defense Force and then shortly thereafter the Peninsula 
Shield Force were utilized to contain the protests and violence. Security force tactics that 
worked well for short durations soon failed once the events were prolonged. 
The lack of coordination between security forces hindered a smooth escalation of 
force in response to protest activities in early 2011. The Ministry of Interior security 
forces are built with the island divided and associated with police districts. Each district 
was responsible for policing actions within their areas except for protest and violent 
activities, which fell mainly to the Special Security Forces Command (SSFC). Under this 
framework, protests and its attributed violence were assumed to be short lived in nature 
and one unit could assume that responsibility. As a consequence, when protests were 
prolonged or grew larger than expected, the SSFC were quickly overwhelmed and 
incapable of adequately responding. The violence between security forces and protesters 
escalated quicker than expected during the initial protests and violence of early 2011, 
overwhelming the police force. The framework of how the Ministry of Interior assessed 
protests and responded was no longer adequate. 
b. Political Response 
In addition to the threat of violence as a detractor from joining protests, the legal 
system was a secondary and just as forceful means to stop participation in protests. The 
legal system was strongly tied with the government through family and tribal associations 
as well as political motivations.74 Accusations of unfair trials and lengthy prison 
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sentences minimized motivation for prospective protesters to actively participate. People 
that found themselves inside the prison and legal system rarely felt like they had a voice 
or adequate defense against charges brought against them. 
Prior to 2011, the Ministry had deemed multiple Shia mosques as illegal and in 
need of closure or destruction. The Shia mosques in questions were built without 
regulation or permission from the government. The government excuse was that since 
they did not have permission and were not built to code, they were unsafe and needed to 
be destroyed for public safety. In a decision of poor timing and perception, the 
government destroyed dozens of these mosques during the early months of the Arab 
Spring in 2011.75 The destruction of mosques considered holy to the Shia population 
solidified the Shia resistance as one for not only political objectives but also religious. 
The destruction of the mosques also indicated to the Shia community that their 
community was now directly threatened politically as well as socially. 
Government officials labeled the protests as an overt Shia attempt to overthrow 
the government.76 By labeling all protests in this sectarian language, the government 
further provoked the situation, stoking further sectarian violence between communities. 
Previous protests were similarly labeled this way in an effort to divide and weaken the 
resolve of the opposition. Identifying protesters through sectarian language and labeling 
them as foreign sponsored in an effort to minimize cooperation between opposition 
groups did not have the same effect this time. Isolating the groups through means of 
physical separation was no longer effective as groups sharing information through social 
media networks were already connected. Labeling them as one group only solidified 
them under one banner.   
After the initial protests and government responses in early 2011, foreign 
investors lost confidence in Bahrain and pulled expat workers, weakening economic 
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progress in the country.77 Not only were Shia leaders not able to access political power, 
but economic and trade opportunities quickly dissipated. Shia elite were directly 
challenged by changing economic factors solidifying their resolve with opposition intents 
on regime change and in turn fueling a larger sectarian fight 
3. Media Considerations 
Media coverage of events was also strictly controlled by the state. Items of news 
and its dissemination were heavily censored with the information reaching the masses 
from a top down approach.78 Minimal input from the populace was included and stories 
negative to the regime were never published. Unofficial media outlets were persecuted 
and shut down while people that supported and spread this news was jailed or harassed. 
According to the Press Freedom Index of 2011–12, Bahrain was ranked 173rd out of 179 
countries with the worst media ranking in the country’s history.79 In light of these 
practices, Bahrain faced a relative crisis of information as the Arab Spring began in 2011. 
Other avenues of media access were minimalized as even mainstream media from 
satellites and Internet were censored. In all practical purposes and internal to the country, 
the state controlled what the people learned. 
Cooperation between opposition groups was exceedingly difficult as media and 
information flow was stagnated by the state. The ability to meet privately and openly was 
critical to exchange ideas and information to various opposition groups. Initial protests in 
the Arab Spring included a mix of diverse groups calling for political reform and change. 
Even amongst the majority Shia participants, groups were fractured along various ideas 
and motivations. There was no single root grievance among all the players at this time 
unifying the efforts. Coordination between these groups occurred but at a slow rate as 
groups needed to meet to discuss ideas and points of joint cooperation. This timely 
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process was easily hindered by state policies and intrusion denying groups the ability to 
meet or even banning groups outright and arresting their members. 
Accompanying the difficulties to coordinate between groups, gaining 
international support was nearly impossible. Media censorship denied the ability of 
opposition groups to spread their story and public perception outside of the country was 
tightly controlled by media releases of state controlled sources. Between the lack of 
external support and the ease of state intrusion between group cohesion, participation in 
high risk events such as protests was risky. Only after showing up to a protest would 
people learn how large the demonstrations were and if there was a risk of being arrested 
or at a minimum identified and detained. 
One other output of state control of the media is the perceived legitimacy of the 
government in contrast to the legitimacy of the protesters. Because the state was able to 
manage the message that left the country, protesters were always assumed to be violent 
and extremist justifying a harsh government response to restore order. The voices of the 
masses were not heard in this arena and the government was good at manipulating the 
message to suit their needs. Years of deceit, media manipulation, and political censorship 
damaged credibility of the state and the effects were felt long after the initial crackdown 
and violence subsided. These actions of the government, combined with years of failed 
negotiations with oppositionists, led to an increased belief by protesters that the 
government was not legitimate.80  
Control and communication during events is the final area identified as a 
traditional avenue of protest greatly affected by social media. Because communication 
was based on face-to-face interactions, protesters had limited contact or communication 
once an event began. As police responded and disrupted events, protesters were left to 
disburse or attempt to band together in small groups wherever they found themselves. 
The ability to mount a cohesive and flexible reaction to the police was severely limited. 
This is not to minimize the fact that many protesters coordinated their efforts and 
conducted both violent and non-violent resistance. The fact was that the state run 
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operations, with their radios and superior communication advantages, were more flexible 
and adaptive to an ever-changing environment during protests. 
Social media use amongst protesters directly countered the state’s ability to 
control the media and censor the information flow. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
channels appeared and showed daily confrontation with police forces. Many times, 
blogs and social media sources were the sole source of information coming out of 
Bahrain during the initial phases of conflict in early 2011. These segments of 
information showed the conflict from the protesters’ point of view, gaining 
international attention and support from other protesters in neighboring countries. 
The government initially lost the advantage in media coverage and conceded 
momentum to the protesters. 
Social media usage after the initial Arab Spring events changed the landscape for 
information flow and dissemination. Networks of people built along familial ties and 
common bonds were built on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In 
comparison with previous methods, social media allowed for an instant exchange of ideas 
and information. People were no longer required to go to the mosque or meet in person to 
organize an event. What was once a lengthy process to organize, now took a fraction of 
the time. Time lines were compressed and rallies and mobilization efforts now 
became nearly instantaneous. According to Hochheimer and Al-Emad, “social media 
users encouraged each other to speak out and to rise up against their authoritarian 
regimes.”81  
Communication flow and dissemination were not the only issues highlighted 
by the initial use of social media. The ability to organize and portray a unified 
presence online furthered the aims illustrated by Kricheli82 to portray a larger 
presence and attract more people to a cause while portraying the government in a 
weak position. In Bahrain’s case, what started as a loose organization of various 
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groups turned into a larger political movement that challenged the government to 
eventually brand some of the protest groups as terrorists.83  
D. OUTCOMES OF INITIAL PROTESTS 
The country felt the effects of the protests and their harsh response almost 
immediately. Using first-hand accounts from protesters and journalists on the ground 
along with videos, blogs and pictures from social media sites, the international media 
projected an image of a country desperate to retain control through violence and any 
means necessary. The government’s control of the media and messages of stability were 
no longer effective tools to control the message regarding their internal problems. The 
ramifications were felt almost immediately throughout the country. Protesters used this 
opportunity to tell their story to the international community in a way that they had never 
been able to before.  
As a result of the government’s actions and the messages that were broadcast, the 
international community harshly criticized and vilified the government and the ruling 
family. The United States suspended military aid while international investments in 
development projects drastically slowed or stopped. Construction projects were unable to 
continue through lack of funding and security risks. Tourism came to a halt as the 
security condition worsened in the country, including cruise ships removing Bahrain from 
their scheduled stops and the Formula 1 tour cancelling their race in Bahrain that year. 
Local business leaders who initially compared 2011 events to previous outbursts of 
protests and violence confided to the author that by mid-2011, the economic viability of 
Bahrain for the immediate future was in question. These outcomes of the protests became 
points of hope for protesters quick to show results. 
Starting in 2011, protesters were winning an online media campaign while 
government forces mainly relied on their traditional means of print and broadcast media 
as a means to reach the people. In addition to telling their story internationally, protesters 
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were quick to target their network of followers with messages of strength as they 
highlighted government failures. Protesters posted messages to show that the protests 
achieved real results and offered hope to continue the movement. Accusations of human 
rights violations, videos showing excessive use of tear gas and force by security forces 
that were posted along with pictures of massive protests became common on social media 
sites. Both domestically and internationally, the conflict in Bahrain became dominated by 
stories that pitted a violent regime against protesters that were deemed the victims.84 
In addition to security changes and an increased media campaign, sectarian 
division was beginning to solidify. Government claims of Iranian meddling and 
identifying the problems of the unrest solely within the Shia community fueled 
sectarianism and division amongst the Bahraini population. As a consequence of the 
sectarian language of the government, the Shia population looked to their own leaders for 
a voice and guidance as they felt marginalized by the government. The main Shia 
opposition political party, Al Wefaq, represents and is the voice of that Shia majority of 
the island through their social, religious, and other programs.85 Initial attempts for a 
national dialogue were rejected by these Shia leaders, who felt they had momentum on 
their side. The power of protests and international pressure presented the Shia leadership 
with an opportunity and window to demand and accept changes in their benefit. This 
window would require compromise on both sides and built on the prospect of increased 
pressures from a growing social movement and unrest maintaining that pressure on the 
government. 
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E. SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA AFTER INITIAL 
PROTESTS 
1. Protesters 
In contrast to historical examples of protest, the protests did not diminish after the 
initial security crack-down and deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force in March 2011. 
Despite the security situation and appeals of the government, protests continued and 
grew. The online forum bahrainonline.org, which had been active since 1998, was widely 
used by protesters and partially credited for the massive amounts of participants in the 
initial protests. Out of this forum came the 14 February Youth Movement, which called 
for continued protests and activism. Incorporating the power and base of supporters from 
the bahrainonline.org forum into the 14 February Youth Movement diversified the 
network of supporters and allowed a collection of smaller networks to combine into one 
large movement. This new online movement allowed supporters to share ideas and 
identify common manners of protest that would be acted upon. The virtual space became 
a breeding ground for ideas and organization while still relying on the smaller networks 
of individuals and activists to organize the actual events.86  
The 14 February Youth Movement was not the only virtual space used by 
protesters although it appeared to be the largest and most comprehensive initially. 
Smaller groups centered on village locations and/or specific ideology soon began taking 
form. The villages of Sitra, Diraz, Saar and Bani Jamra each formed their own online 
movements and used their forums to advocate activism and protests centered in their 
villages. While larger forums offered an area to share ideas, the smaller forums were 
places of coordination and organization.  
Protesters additionally used social media to coordinate their efforts to offset 
security force efforts of containment. Social media has been found to alter tactics of 
protest groups and aid their ability to share information and coordinate attacks.87 An 
                                                 
86 T. C. Jones, and A. Al-Shehabi, “Bahrain’s Revolutionaries,” Middle East Channel on Foreign 
Policy, Communication 2 (2012). 
87 Julia Skinner, “Social Media and Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement As Seen 
Through Three Information Studies Paradigms,” Working Papers on Information Systems 11 (2011): 13. 
 46
example of coordinating efforts can be found in Bahrain as well. As police were engaged 
in responses to major demonstrations, key intersections in surrounding areas would then 
be attacked in an apparent effort to block traffic, delay further police responses and cause 
daily lives to be interrupted. Examples like these highlighted the potential for social 
media to be used to coordinate attacks between groups to achieve a higher purpose of 
disrupting daily life, impeding police responses and show that the government was 
unable to contain protesters actions. 
Activists and protesters used social media to exchange ideas and formulate plans 
but were in some ways affected by those in charge of the sites. Logos and slogans were 
formed at each site that offered a unity amongst its members. Signs, shirts and banners 
could be seen during rallies and protests from the different online groups. What started as 
a place to share ideas soon became a rally point for individuals to identify with and use to 
justify and coordinate actions. 
2. Government Reactions 
Despite condemnation of tactics used during the initial protests, security 
forces continued to use what human rights observers called excessive amounts of tear 
gas and brute force to manage protesters.88 The Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry commissioned by the King supported the initial claims and highlighted the 
excessive use of tear gas while implicating multiple government units for excessive 
use of force. After the release of the commission’s report, the King announced in 
media that there would be reforms made and apologized for any misdeeds that had 
occurred. This message was received with mixed signals among the population. 
While supporters of the government were quick to point out that the government was 
reacting appropriately, protesters and activists took to social media to express their 
lack of trust that any real change would occur.  
Soon after protests initially diminished and with increased security presence 
of the Peninsula Shield Force, government officials declared that the area around the 
Pearl Monument was off limits and destroyed the actual monument. Additionally, 
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various Shia mosques deemed by government officials as illegal were demolished 
under questionable circumstances. In all appearances, these actions along with a state 
of national emergency with curfews and movement restrictions were an attempt by 
the government to deny protesters access to free spaces to meet. 
Another means to deny literal space was the government’s decision to limit 
some sanitation and cleaning services to historical areas of protest and violence. In 
early 2011, government workers could be seen daily cleaning graffiti and rubble left 
from evening protests and violence in an effort to maintain cleanliness and an orderly 
appearance. By the end of 2011, these services were restricted to main thoroughfares 
through select areas, leaving the neighborhoods responsible for cleaning. This was 
also done mainly as a security risk due to improvised explosives being found in the 
rubble, which caused injury to sanitation workers when they detonated. This 
restriction in mostly poor Shia neighborhoods left the impression with residents that 
their government was unable to maintain their social contract with the citizens and 
provide them with basic services. The unintended consequence was a further divide 
between the government and people that were further exacerbated as residents took 
to social media to post their dissatisfaction with the government. 
Along with the destruction and denial of actual spaces, government officials 
also detained key protest leaders, students and faculty of the Bahrain University, 
health care workers of the Salmaniya hospital and an undetermined amount of 
citizens declared as part of the violence and protests that occurred. In all appearances, 
the government attempted to disrupt, deny and harass the leaders of the protest 
movements with the hopes of stalling any future momentum. Just like the denial of 
free spaces, this move failed to address the essence of the movement and only 
contributed to a more united and hardened opposition.89 
Although the initial protests contained some Sunni activists along with the 
majority Shia activists calling for reform, social media groups appeared to be divided 
along sectarian lines. As social media groups are normally aligned along familial and 
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friendship ties, this was no surprise. The actions of an apparent united front against 
the ruling family and a call not only for reform but regime change, the government 
soon began using sectarian language by referring to protesters as the Shia protesters. 
This decision was similar to previous tactics that were used to divide and isolate the 
Shia population from power while unifying the Sunni base of support for the regime. 
This time, there was an unintended consequence that this action also unified and 
appeared to solidify the resolve of the Shia population as well. In essence, by 
classifying the problem as a sectarian issue as opposed to reformist demands that 
were initially called for, government actions supported the protesters’ accusations 
that the government was only consolidating power.  
Government officials continued reliance on radio, television and print media 
could not maintain parody with the speed of communication amongst social media 
users. Locals used community sites such as mums in Bahrain Facebook page to 
identify what roads were blocked from protest and where protests were planned or 
ongoing. Citizens would use Twitter or Facebook to post pictures of ongoing 
conflicts or protests to warn others to stay away. Although certain government 
offices such as the Ministry of Interior maintained a Facebook page, they were not a 
main source of news by late 2012. 
Although not specifically a concerted effort by the government trolling of 
protester social media sites became more active from 2011 to 2012. This type of 
behavior consists of “aggressive Internet communication where people using 
anonymous accounts engage in abusive behavior towards other users.”90 The increase 
in trolling had the reported impact of intimidation towards protesters and people who 
shared ideas on these sites. It can be assumed that the intimidation was meant to limit 
participation in protests and the role that this free space allowed. Unforeseen by those 
behind these actions, subscribers and members of these groups moved to an 
anonymous status to protect their identity and those of their family. Instead of 
limiting actions on social media, trolling and aggressive behavior only contributed to 
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further uniting protesters and users of these sites while making it harder to identify 
the people behind the movements.91 
Through mid-2012, security forces continued to rely on an increased security 
presence throughout the country to contain and isolate protests and minimize their 
ability to mass as during early 2011. Although initial efforts were made in police 
units at this time to identify the locations of protests by monitoring social media 
sites, the police were not organized to respond as fast as needed to match the speed 
of organization and mobilization that social media provided the protesters. As 
previously discussed, social media groups at this point were built around small 
groups in villages as part of a larger framework and were able to quickly notify and 
mobilize in the streets.92  
Police units were still consolidated in a few major bases around the island 
nation making it difficult to respond quickly. In order to maintain the coverage 
needed, the National Guard was used to fill static security locations, most notably 
around the old Pearl Monument location, while police units remained on high alert. 
Checkpoints in historically violent areas remained, and the taxing on manpower soon 
became burdening. 
Through 2012, talks on reform remained on hold until early 2013 when the 
national dialogue between the government and opposition leaders resumed. By this 
point, protests had endured 2 years of activities with increased violence against 
government forces and a prolonged and increasingly sectarian divide amongst the 
population. The continued protests fueled by an active online audience maintained 
their ability to thwart government attempts to dislodge their power. The main 
opposition group Al Wefaq was bolstered by this support although they maintained a 
separation from the majority of online groups. Al Wefaq gained power from the 
youth movement’s use of social media and their inherent ability to disseminate 
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information quickly, as well as the ability of these same youth groups to mobilize 
rapidly.  
F. END OF THE RISE OF THE PROTESTERS 
By the end of 2013, protests continued to occur on a nightly basis with a sharp 
rise in violence including bombs, Molotov cocktails and attacks against security 
forces. Although the police were able to isolate and control the protests and 
subsequent violence, the experience was taxing on the manpower and ability of the 
government to respond. More important, up to this point, the protesters had enjoyed 
freedom of movement through their social networks to share ideas, organize and 
disseminate information virtually untouched by government control. Government 
attempts to control protests and the violence rooted in a long history of protests 
focused on reactionary methods that only caused a further sectarian divide among the 
people. 
While social media was not the root cause of protests and subsequent 
violence, it played a major role in providing the space for individuals to associate and 
organize with other like-minded individuals. This space did not replace the 
traditional role of face-to-face interactions necessary for social mobilizations to 
occur, rather the networks built along with the ease of access to share and receive 
information propelled the mobilization process to new heights. This newfound 
interaction enabled the extension of protests to endure even during harsh security 
conditions. The country found itself in a sectarian conflict with newfound powers to 
the Shia community as a result of a continued series of unrest and violence.  
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IV. REPRESSION AND FATIGUE—2013–2015  
Protests started under the banner of the Arab Spring continued in 2013 continually 
putting pressure on the government. Social media continued to play a role in organizing 
rallies, protest and disseminating information while stoking the flames of historical 
political and sectarian divides. The role of social media may not have caused the protests 
to start and was not the root cause for the grievances within the society; however, it was 
used as a means to mobilize a population prepared to revolt. The rapid rise of 
mobilization that occurred early in 2011 had given power and a commanding presence to 
the protesters and subsequently the established opposition parties to the ruling 
government. 
By 2013, the rise of the protesters was met with increased resistance by the 
government security forces as well as the population itself.93 Youth groups that mobilized 
under the banner of 14 February online movement had fractured into village-based 
organizations with more radical views and violent actions. Unity amongst the different 
groups became harder to achieve as their diverse goals and intents at times competed with 
Al Wefaq’s goals of reform. The momentum of the protesters appeared to be slowing 
under the effects of a prolonged fight without the quick successes gained in Egypt or 
Tunisia. The role of social media as a free space appeared to no longer give a distinct 
advantage to one group or the other. The effects of politics, economics, group dynamics 
and an enduring heightened state of security and continuing protests and violence 
changed the interaction between protesters and the rest of the population.94 
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1. Youth Movements 
When protests began in 2011, protesters rallied for grievances that historically 
divided the country. The use of social media filled a vacuum of information exchange 
and enabled the mobilization to occur prompting an international outcry for change and 
restraint against the government. Youth groups coordinated their information exchanges 
through online networks such as Bahrain Online while monitoring social media feeds 
coming out of Egypt and Tunisia.95 The mass rallies and spread of information to the 
international world became the visible output of this movement. The secondary effect of 
these actions was the building of a large network of users enabled to disseminate and 
share information quickly. 
By 2013, the online 14 Feb youth movement remained strong as a space to 
disseminate information and organize protests. Online postings by the group highlighted 
the ability of the protesters to gather and stand up to police actions. Police tactics shown 
in the videos identified security tactics including the use of tear gas and harassment and 
detention of those involved in the protest. 
Youth groups by this point had formed neighborhood organizations with their 
own Facebook page and social media groups. Sitra, Muharraq, Diraz, and Saar are only a 
few of these youth organizations that formed their own identities and followings. Their 
goals and tactics varied but centered on regime change and violent protests against 
security forces. These groups used social media as their platform to project images of 
unity and strength. Videos set to music with accompanying messages of resistance on 
YouTube channels such as RevolutionBahrainMC and related Facebook pages show their 
groups attacking police checkpoints with Molotov Cocktails, rocks and improvised 
explosives.  
By 2013 one group in particular, Al Ashtar Brigade was using their online 
message to not only incite opposition to the government but also to take credit for 
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bombings and other violent actions against security forces. These actions ultimately led 
to the government labeling the group along with two others in March 2014 as terrorist 
organizations.96 Even after being labeled as terrorists, the group continued to remain 
active using violence and posting videos showing their actions. 
Each of the youth groups illustrated used various means of resistance that ranged 
from simple information exchanges to violent actions. A common thread amongst the 
groups was their use of social media as a free space to disseminate their ideology. With 
this common platform, each of their social networks was able to learn from each other 
and gain from each other’s actions. As one group organized protests in one area, the other 
groups could monitor and plan corresponding protests or violent attacks in a coordinated 
effort. In this sense, through online networking, groups that had varying intentions could 
capitalize on the other groups actions by coordinating efforts through their digital free 
spaces. 
In addition to the youth groups use of social media to spread information, various 
other online forums including Mums in Bahrain spread information to the community at 
large to help residents avoid the violence and disruptions that routinely accompanied the 
protests. Starting in late 2012, the Sunni associated group Defend Bahrain started with 
the intent of “defending Bahrain’s reputation against regional and international 
conspiracies.”97 In total, anyone with access to the Internet had a variety of social media 
accounts to choose from as a source of news. Similar to television news channels that 
cater to individual ideologies, religious beliefs and political leanings, opposition and 
protesters similarly organized social media accounts.  
2. Al Wefaq 
During the rise of the youth groups, Al Wefaq remained the main political 
opposition party to the Khalifa government. Separate from the angst and bitterness of the 
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youth groups that called for a complete change of the government, Al Wefaq remained 
steady in their conviction that the future of the country rested with a constitutional 
monarchy and an elected government.98 The organization had deep ties within the Shia 
communities and has been a visible part of the political landscape within the country. 
Although, the organization has a long history, their association with the more social 
media savvy youth groups is tenuous and full of advantages and disadvantages. 
Early on in the protest, Al Wefaq used the social media driven campaigns of the 
14 February youth movement to inspire hope to their constituents. The national dialogue 
headed by the Crown Prince soon after the initial violence began in 2011 ended in failure 
for both the Crown Prince and Al Wefaq as the main representative of the opposition. 
This failure is credited for a divide between the ambiguous youth movement inspiring the 
protests and Al Wefaq who was seen as incapable of negotiating with the government.99  
As protests grew and youth movements continued to diversify online and 
intensify in violence and rhetoric, Al Wefaq at times seemed marginalized in the process. 
Opposition to the government appeared to be further broken down by an older generation 
that sought political reform and inclusion with a government and a youthful online 
centered opposition that sought regime change and taking complete power from a Sunni 
dominated government. Interesting to note is that by 2013, the same disappointment in Al 
Wefaq that fueled the initial online youth movements would then plague the same youth 
movements who had not gained the initiative.  
Without an online base similar to the youth movements, Al Wefaq was left at a 
disadvantage to mobilize protests in competition. Instead of competing, Al Wefaq 
expertly maintained a separation from the youth movements core cause while still being 
enabled by the ability of the youth groups to mobilize large groups of protesters. As 
social media campaigns were used to mobilize rallies for change, Al Wefaq piggybacked 
and assisted or participated in the same rallies. In this sense, they were able to capitalize 
on the success of the mobilization efforts of the youth groups while minimizing their 
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investment in building their own online social networks. As dissatisfaction with the youth 
movement’s ability to enact regime change has grown, Al Wefaq continued to push their 
message of reform and inclusion.  
Al Wefaq was also able to use the strength of the socially networked protesters 
and their ability to mobilize large rallies as a show of force to the government. The 
continued protests and rallies demonstrated to the King as well as the international 
community that the people of Bahrain wanted change. Videos from social media sites of 
harsh police responses and brutality were highlighted in Al Wefaq speeches maintaining 
the group’s presence as a voice for reform.  
Al Wefaq benefits from the ongoing strife and prolonged protests fueled by social 
media’s use as a free space to organize. On the issue of violence, Al Wefaq maintained 
the right of the people to protest but maintained a separation from the actual acts. The 
free space that social media offered to organize and mobilize could also be characterized 
as a faceless entity. Although Al Wefaq did not directly involve their organization with 
violence, government officials claim that Al Wefaq participated in its planning and 
organization. These charges resulted in the party being banned from political 
participation in 2014 before the first parliamentary elections held since 2011.100 While 
not directly influencing the free space, Al Wefaq enjoyed the benefits of mobilization 
organized by youth groups but were later implicated when the youth groups became too 
violent as seen by their latest ban from political involvement. 
3. Organizational Changes 
Social media’s use as a free space enables organizational changes to occur within 
the protest groups. Throughout Bahrain’s history of protest, solidarity amongst the 
varying opposition groups continually plagued their effectiveness. The ability to share a 
narrative was difficult under a regime quick to separate groups, imprison leaders and 
deny physical spaces to meet. Social media provided the space needed to circumvent 
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nearly every one of these tools of repression and allow cohesion and unity amongst a 
diverse population. 
Building off of historic grievances and watching the Arab Spring unfold in the 
region with dramatic effects unified opposition in Bahrain. Youth groups that grew up 
watching their fathers and mothers protest with few results felt hope that the time was 
right for change. Under the banner of reform, initial protests and rallies occurred 
throughout Bahrain. The harsh government response and subsequent crackdown and 
arrests changed the atmosphere of reform to one of regime change. The free space that 
facilitated the initial call for mobilization under a unified banner thereafter became a 
place where smaller groups formed but remained loosely connected through newfound 
online forums. The free space offered by social media literally enabled the formation of 
smaller neighborhood based groups to form out of the larger opposition movement. 
Social media use in Bahrain since 2011 enabled unity amongst a diverse 
population. Online followers receive information generally from the point of view of the 
protests. Classifying the situation as the people against the government enabled a sense of 
belonging and unity amongst followers. This sense of belonging has the unintended 
consequence of polarizing the viewpoint between the two groups. As groups become 
more polarized in their views, it then becomes harder to compromise and reach an 
agreement between sides. This is demonstrated through the change in intent from the 
beginning of the protests in 2011 through the calls for regime change by 2012 and 2013. 
Compromise and negotiation were taken out of the equation in videos and blogs that can 
clearly still be seen today on the revolutionbahrainmc YouTube channel.  
This sense of unity served its purpose well as protests grew and endured since 
2011, but as the prospect for regime change weakened, so did the resolve of the people. 
In late 2012, alternate YouTube and Facebook channels including pro government 
organizations such as DefendBahrain and also increased use of the Ministry of Interior 
Facebook page offered an alternative view of the protests to subscribers. Similar to the 
protest social media depiction of us versus them mentality, the pro-government pages 
offered a similar view but from the opposite perspective. Protesters were routinely 
labeled as illegal or terrorist and the actions of the police were labeled as protecting the 
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population. In an attempt to win control of the free space that social media provided, pro-
government sites allowed an alternate but competing source of news. With both sides 
represented, the people were given a chance of understanding two sides of the same 
circumstance. No longer was there just one side portrayed but a more-well balanced 
understanding could be found. 
4. Protest, Violence and the Media 
Social media has not only been a source of free space to mobilize protest but also 
share violent actions of protesters and security forces. Since protests and violence began 
in 2011, there have been increasingly radical elements found amongst the protesters.101 
As previously discussed, Al Ashtar Brigade is only one of those groups that claim 
responsibility for bombings, violence, and killings of security forces. These elements 
have found an outlet in the free space that social media provides. Videos depicting 
violence both from the protesters as well as from the ensuing police responses continue to 
be common throughout Bahrain. Increased sharing of this violence is not limited internal 
to the country. International media groups and journalists unable to witness protests first 
hand routinely used clips posted through social media sites. Without firsthand accounts, 
the possibility and probability that biases previously discussed were found in these video 
clips.  
Videos showing heavy police presence and excessive use of tear gas were readily 
seen in media coverage of early 2011 and 2012 protests in Bahrain. Seeing firsthand the 
same events, many times the protester violence that incited the heavy security response 
was not shown as the clip had been edited by the protesters themselves. The government 
likewise edited their videos as state run news pieces solely focused on violent protesters 
while minimalizing the effects of the tear gas or security restrictions on a village. Overall, 
the use of social media is a free space to share videos, photos and accounts of protests 
and violence offering a rich source for media outlets looking for information albeit with a 
cost that bias and misguided perspectives are easily inserted. 
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Social media use has further shaped protests and violence in Bahrain in that there 
has been an escalation of protester violence in an attempt to maintain the momentum 
against security forces. This idea of using social media to promote the dynamics of social 
change is supported by research that claims, “Communication networks can serve as 
powerful accelerators of social transformation.”102 Bahrain provides an example of social 
media use in protesters actions and conflict violence over a sustained period of time. 
Initial protest activities shared through social media sites were widely covered in 2011 by 
major media distributors. As protests endured over time though, media coverage waned 
and only picked up after a more violent attack occurred. This theory is further supported 
by the research of Michael Jetter as he found that media coverage is an indicator of future 
violence and terrorist acts.103 
B. GOVERNMENT 
1. Security Organization 
Social media use amongst protesters had many effects and consequences. Early on 
in the movement, quickened mobilization and dissemination of information were 
arguably the largest visible outcome of its use. The security organizations in Bahrain felt 
the immediate effects of this output as security forces were overwhelmed in the initial 
protests. The Peninsula Shield Force entered Bahrain along with the mobilization of the 
Bahrain Defense Force and the National Guard to restore order and a sense of control in 
the country. An additional outcome of the increased mobilization linked to social media 
use was that protests and opposition activities continued to endure despite the security 
tactics used to isolate and contain protests and the ensuing violence. 
The continued mobilization of protesters led to the extended presence of the 
National Guard to secure locations including the old Pearl Monument. The activation of 
the National Guard assuming responsibilities from the Ministry of Interior for certain 
infrastructure and key location security allowed the police forces to maintain a front line 
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presence and response capability to protest and violent activities. As of 2015, the 
National Guard continues to actively support the Ministry of Interior. Although the 
mission of the National Guard is to support both the Ministry of Interior and the Defense 
Force, the extended support over the last four years has placed an additional burden on 
the tasking of their force. 
In addition to the sustained mobilization of the National Guard in support of the 
Ministry of Interior, the United Arab Emirates continued to send police officers as part of 
the GCC agreement as late as 2014. In March of that year, an Emirati police officer died 
from wounds sustained after a roadside bomb detonated during riots in the village of 
Daih.104 The continued support from the GCC after four years of protests along with the 
continued support of the National Guard is an indicator of a continued need for additional 
resources by the Ministry of Interior. 
Trust and relationships are instrumental to building a social network online just as 
it is in person. A key to the success of the mobilization effort in Bahrain was that social 
networks built along familial and tribal lines and inherently contained that trust. As a 
result of historic divides and grievances, protesters did not have the same level of trust 
with government sources nor with the established opposition political parties.105 
Additionally, media sources in Bahrain are mainly state controlled and are generally 
biased toward the government’s perspective. As a result of this trust issue, information 
from government sources was generally dismissed by not only the protesters but also 
media sources hungry for information on the ongoing protests.  
Government attempts to use social media as a means to disseminate information 
were received initially with skepticism. Like the Bahrain News Agency or local 
newspapers, Twitter and Facebook feeds were looked at as another tool of propaganda 
from the state. Police officers associated with this program noticed a change by late 2012 
after an increase in public bombings and associated deaths of not only police but 
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civilians. By this point in time, protester aims of regime change were no closer to being 
achieved than in early 2011 and the civilian populace appeared tired of the continued 
violence. Steady use of messaging with an increased effort on rapid dissemination 
appeared to increase followers. Speaking with other locals at the time, the Ministry feed 
provided an alternative narrative to events and was used in conjunction with other 
sources to understand the ongoing political and protest environment. 
As a direct result of social media postings and videos, police actions were under 
constant scrutiny from inside the country and at times internationally. Cameras at nearly 
every protest event captured police responses and were quickly spread through Twitter, 
Facebook and YouTube channels. By 2013, security forces were keenly aware of the 
protesters use of videos and the potential for international outcry when human rights 
abuses were recorded. Security forces were also aware of the potential threat these 
recordings were to their operations as each response to protest was recorded. This tactic 
was common in Afghanistan and Iraq at the time against coalition forces. 
2. Political Dialogue 
Social media groups amongst the protesters by late 2013 had migrated to 
neighborhood and smaller groupings of individuals.106 After the violence of 2011 began, 
government officials increased sectarian language attempting to divide protesters from 
the people. The use of sectarian language only solidified the position of protesters pitting 
the government and their supporters against a more unified majority of the population. As 
social networks changed, the use of multiple free spaces through social media enabled the 
government to try new methods to divide and separate them.  
By 2014, the government had changed their stance of identifying the protests as a 
Shia problem, instead separating violent protesters and their supporting organizations 
from the rest of the population.107 Although the government still places blame on Iranian 
support for violence and unrest, changing the language to unity and nationalism offers the 
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populace a choice of reconciliation without denouncing religious ties. Billboards were 
placed throughout the country with nationalistic slogans that culminated in a nationalism 
conference that was held in February 2015. The move away from purely sectarian to 
nationalistic language enabled the government to allow protesters an option to align with 
pro-reform oppositionists and enable another chance at a national dialogue. The evolution 
of online social groups into smaller niche groups enabled this type of movement and 
change in ideals.  
To further offset the free space to communicate provided by social media, 
government officials announced amendments to laws in late 2013 that limited an 
opposition leader’s ability to meet with foreign entities without permission from the 
government.108 This change strengthened the government’s ability to monitor the 
opposition’s communication with potential sources of support or sympathy. While unable 
to limit the free space that social media provided, the government took steps within their 
power to limit real world contact. 
A national dialogue and ability to maintain communication with opposition and 
protesters was a key necessity in the findings of the BICI report and supported by western 
allies to Bahrain. Opposition leaders, feeling strengthened by a strong mobilization fueled 
by social media of Bahrainis against the government were quick to abstain through 2013 
from dialogue if their demands were not met. By 2014 as hope diminished amongst 
protesters of real change, and increased information across social media platforms that 
highlighted both sides of the conflict, the government had an opportunity to strengthen 
their position. 
Using the need to uphold the rule of law, law enforcement officials vigorously 
detained and arrested protesters committing violence, opposition members accused of 
inciting violence or speaking ill of the King as well as those violating the newly amended 
law requiring opposition parties to register meetings with foreign entities. An example of 
the emboldened police actions can be seen in the banning of Al Wefaq from political 
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participation in late 2014 and the increased arrests of senior Al Wefaq members. These 
arrests and flagrant moves to stifle the opposition occurred without unifying the masses 
as had occurred in 2011. Protests and rallies denouncing the government’s actions did 
occur but only on a smaller scale than before.  
3. The Continued Media Battle 
In early 2011, media interest in Bahrain as part of the Arab Spring was high.109 
Government restrictions on media forced international media outlets to search and use 
social media sources for information on the unrest. Bloggers, youth protest organizations 
and opposition leaders freely shared images and stories highlighting their positions and 
vilifying the government. By 2013, after an increase in improvised explosive devices, 
Molotov Cocktails and nightly violence aimed against security forces, protesters no 
longer held the moral high ground they once occupied in 2011. Government sources used 
social media’s free spaces to share their stories and continually emphasized the terrorist 
actions of violent protesters. The free space became a place full of multiple viewpoints 
where previously it was dominated by protesters.  
In addition to changes in the landscape of the free space of social media, 
international headlines began moving away from the Arab Spring. Sectarian divides and 
historic grievances that fueled the opposition in Bahrain from before 2011 remained after 
and did not offer the same story of change that Egypt and Tunisia brought. Only more 
extreme acts of violence would occasionally bring the spotlight back to Bahrain. This 
time though, the violence was instigated by the protesters, not the government. 
Legitimacy and trust were also at stake by 2013–14. Protesters claims for 
legitimacy while using accusations of human rights abuses against the government no 
longer held the same sting. Government officials used similar tactics of showing videos 
of protester violence and the destruction, vandalism and human toll it took on civilian 
victims as well as security forces.  
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Government oppression of media continued through 2013–14 with state run 
media outlets continuing to provide the bulk of print and televised media. Social media 
was also incorporated into the government’s message as an alternative to opposition 
voices. Regular daily tweets were sent by Ministry of Interior offices to inform the public 
on matters from road and traffic conditions to areas blocked to violence and protests. 
C. OUTCOMES  
1. Political Opportunities 
As a result of initial mass protests, protesters and Al Wefaq as the main 
opposition party appeared stronger politically. Government policies and security postures 
changed after an international outcry against human rights abuses by the government 
along with pressure against the government by the United States and other Western 
nations. Although not a direct result of social media use, these changes within the 
government political system were byproducts of the mobilization that occurred because 
of the free space provided by social media. However, as protests continued as a result of 
free spaces, oppositionists were unable to capitalize on this newfound bargaining power. 
As of 2015, government officials have declared multiple youth protests groups as 
terrorists and barred Al Wefaq from political participation under accusations of breaking 
laws, supporting violence and speaking against king.110 Any advantages that initially 
were won through increased mobilization eventually were lost as protester and opposition 
momentum was lost. Social media as a tool for expression and used as a free space was 
not sufficient in itself to actuate change. Over time, as the will of protesters waned, 
government tactics to separate and divide the opposition through security and political 
means gained the upper hand. 
Protests continue to this day but without the media focus and international 
attention as was seen in 2011. Government officials are able to cite the rule of law and 
various political measures to limit the amount and size of protests. Mass mobilizations as 
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seen in 2011 are no longer occurring although protests occur on a nightly basis. Increased 
communication from government sources now offer competing sources of information to 
inform and influence popular support for protests. 
Government officials have shown effort to abide by international norms and 
improve their record of human rights abuses since 2011. This effort was supported by the 
recent decision of the United States government to lift military aid restrictions in June 
2015 to both the Defense Force and National Guard.111 The King’s decision to bring in 
an outside evaluation of events that resulted in the BICI recommendations and efforts to 
abide by those same recommendations have worked to offset the effects human rights 
accusations stemming from 2011 and the ongoing conflict.  
Since 2011, the government has continued to allow protests to occur under certain 
restrictions.112 This political decision is in line with the country’s history of protests and 
allowing the people to publically display grievances. Although this decision seemed to 
run counter to the early ability of protesters to mobilize and gain international support, 
over the long run has proven to work to the government’s advantage. Enduring protests 
and violence have hurt the country politically and economically, damaging further 
opportunities for success of both the Sunni and Shia populations. Allowing low levels of 
protests and even violence to continue have also worked to discredit violent protesters 
and the organizations they represent and support them. The policy has also led to a 
feeling of fatigue from local families affected by the violence and constant security state. 
In the battle to win popular support, the steady and continual ability of the state to 
manage and control protests has won over the short term successes brought on in part to 
the use of social media to mobilize. 
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2. Separation and Divisions  
“Research indicates that, despite cross-sect origins, the 2011 uprisings in Bahrain 
fell into divisive sectarianism, with social media expounding anti-Shia rhetoric.”113 
Sectarianism endures in Bahrain despite a renewed call for nationalism by the 
government. What started in 2011 as a call for reform between oppositionists to the 
government and the ruling elite has devolved into a deeply sectarian divided country. 
Aspects of social media use may lead to deeper divisions within the community. Social 
networks built along familial or religious lines would tend to re-post comments from like-
minded people or groups polarizing an issue and furthering the divide within the conflict. 
As an example, the 14 February Youth Coalition used increasingly polarized language in 
its postings as well as calling for increased violence against security forces. 
Youth groups that formed since 2011 continued this discourse of division in their 
sites and social networks. The use of social media as a free space to maintain this type of 
dialogue is not unique but rather allows for a continuing discourse like this to be 
maintained in spite of harsher government restrictions and repressive tactics. In essence, 
social media has only prolonged and deepened the conversations that would normally 
occur and offered an open forum that is available 24 hours a day. With this opportunity, 
social media has only become an extension and continuation of social networks that 
would normally occur in real world setting. 
In addition to a divide amongst social media users, physical separation has only 
increased the sectarian divide within the country as well. Bahrain is made up of multiple 
villages that are mainly divided along sectarian lines. While neighborhoods physically 
touch one another, the residents increasingly felt socially divided since 2011. The most 
isolated have been Shia neighborhoods such as Sitra or Saar where nightly violence from 
protests are met with an increased security presence, checkpoints and scrutiny. 
Neighborhoods that were once beautiful and clean prior to 2011 are now marred with 
burnt tires, bricks taken from the road strewn along the sidewalks and makeshift 
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blockades from rioters. Local residents in these neighborhoods that once were filled with 
hope for change from initial protests now only desire a return to normalcy.114 The 
physical divide of the country only strengthens the sectarian divide of the people. 
3. The Role of Social Media as the New Free Space 
Social media enabled a compressed timeline and opportunity for mobilization as 
old grievances were stoked but not started. Trust in the free space was greater than with 
the government due to long standing history of repression and misinformation. While the 
government worked to overcome this by increasing their own output of information, 
online forums were increasing filled with options for news that people could choose 
from. Social media had the potential as a free space to unite people under a cause but not 
the source of unification. Early on in 2011, the unifying symbol was the change brought 
on by the Arab Spring but now, four years later, this symbol does not hold the same 
value. Social media maintains its worth as a free space while elites on both side search 
for a new symbol to unify and mobilize their people. 
By 2014 as the government strengthened their control over the populace, why did 
the public not mobilize as they did in 2011? The social networks remained strong and 
even more interconnected than in times past. Social and sectarian grievances still existed. 
This thesis argues that multiple factors contributed to the situation. First, the hope for 
change that was evident in 2011 as other governments fell was no longer visible. Second, 
after years of bitter fighting, the youth groups were unable to fulfill their promise of 
change and residents of the contested areas only saw increased security presence, tear gas 
and physical intimidation as a result of the youth’s actions. Third, social networks had 
been filled with videos and photos of violence for four years by this point and were 
unable to gain the media’s attention as they did in early 2011. This last point lessened the 
ability of protesters to garner international support and weakened their bargaining 
position with the government. And fourth, even though the tool of social media to 
mobilize was still available, it did not lower the threshold to participate in protest or 
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violence as it had previously done. Videos of people gathering in the streets were soon 
followed with images of violence and ultimately arrests of those involved. By 2015, 
government sources were quick to label the violence as terrorist acts followed quickly by 
arrests and intimidation of those involved. The motivation for the average participant to 
join protests was far weaker than earlier. Without a change in government as promised by 
early calls for change, protests became routine and effected little change with no recourse 
against government control or oppression. In this sense, social media only enhanced the 
will of the people not to join as images and newsfeeds of government harassment and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Bahrain has witnessed regimes fall in the 
region and felt the effects of increased violence and repression within their own borders. 
The feeling of hope that felt tangible to protesters in 2011 lessened over time and instead 
was replaced with a longing for normalcy in their daily routines. Groups of youth, 
unhappy with the government and feeling increasingly marginalized after the crackdown 
of 2011, became increasingly violent, fueling an increased tension and repression by 
security forces. The never-ending spiral of violence between protesters and security 
forces affected every person living on the island in some way. 
In addition to spiraling violence, the ability to maintain a dialogue has continued 
to plague the conflict. When sectarian language dominated government speech early in 
this evolution of conflict, there was little room to negotiate or find common ground. As 
time progressed and sectarian views hardened, so did their desires to return to a time in 
their history when Sunni and Shia lived peacefully together in the end. A common desire 
from both sides was an end to the violence and political and economic prosperity in the 
Kingdom. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH  
The use of social media offered a free space, never before available at this 
extent, to protesters.115 Government tactics to divide and disrupt activities, while 
limiting contact between participants, was no longer valid. Massive police presence 
on the streets and harsh security tactics no longer had the same effect. Groups moved 
their networking and mobilization efforts online and continued to gain momentum 
despite the efforts of the government. In the case of Bahrain, the protests grew 
despite all efforts of the government as protesters adapted and used the new resource 
available. Government forces, at the same time, were unaware the shift to social 
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media, as a free space to protesters, had occurred and took over a year to adapt and 
regain their own momentum.  
Social media has been and continues to be an important tool used in 
Bahrain.116 Illustrated by the government’s lack of ability to respond, social media 
use arguably gave the advantage initially to the protesters. For a tool to have such 
power is incredibly important to understand. Could this occur again in another region 
or possibly a second wave of Arab Spring like events within the Middle East? Only 
time will tell. What we do know is that governments are no longer ignorant of this 
new tool and have honed their skills in its use as well. It is possible that the next time 
an event occurs like this, the free space that social media became in 2011 might not 
hold the same power. 
B. FINDINGS 
1. Research Questions 
 What role has social media played in the Bahraini political movements 
since 2011? 
Research indicates that social media enabled the spread of activism from the 
regional Arab Spring unrest to Bahrain.117 Residents of the country witnessed historic 
political changes happen quickly as people in Egypt and Tunisia quickly mobilized and 
toppled their respective governments. Instilling a sense of hope and a possible pathway to 
success, Bahrainis mobilized and started their own version of the Arab Spring. In this 
sense, social media’s role was an enabler rather than a root cause for the political 
movements in Bahrain.  
Social media also presented a unique opportunity for Bahrainis to watch protest 
mobilizations occur instantaneously in their own country, witnessing for maybe the first 
time in their life, protesters overwhelming the security forces and occupying large pieces 
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of physical space, headquartered around the Pearl Monument in the financial district. 
This ability to monitor the situation through social media lowered the threshold to join 
ongoing protests as the threat of retaliation from the government appeared to be lowered 
initially. 
Additionally, social media enabled increased communication amongst the 
protesters.118 As Bahrainis watched events unfold throughout the region, new networks 
were formed, predominately under the banner of 14 February Coalition. These new 
networks created a free space with increased participation from like-minded individuals 
desiring reform and increased participation in the government. This new free space 
allowed increased opportunities for a political dialogue amongst its participants which 
potentially led to the change from calls for reform to a desire to overthrow the 
government. 
After the brutal response of the government and ensuing security crackdown, the 
calls for regime change further solidified as an us versus them mentality with little room 
for compromise.119 Government responses to use sectarian language in classifying the 
protests as an Iranian backed plot to overthrow the government further intensified the 
divisions within the society. Social media use facilitated conversations that led to this 
further divide as protesters went online to air their grievances in this new free space. 
Government efforts to physically deny protesters the opportunity to meet and share these 
types of ideas had no effect as social media provided them a digital space untouched by 
the government’s efforts. 
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 Did social media facilitate or encourage a space for free expressions of 
ideas or did the dominant groups utilize social media to promote their 
agenda and shape social unrest outcomes? 
From the early protests of 2011, social media became a free space that encouraged 
free expression amongst the protesters.120 The free space allowed protesters in Bahrain to 
share in the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia through actively watching the events unfold 
and building a base for support for protest activities in Bahrain. The free space was 
dominated initially by youth protesters looking for a place to connect and share images, 
videos and their own personal accounts of the protests. Social media also became a free 
space for outside interests including media outlets to observe and use information from 
inside the country and share with the international community. 
As time progressed and the protest mobilization diminished, the social networks 
remained active. Under the umbrella of a larger youth movement, numerous smaller 
groups formed with neighborhood ties allowing for diversification in their discussions. 
Each group had their own grievances and perceptions of the protests similar to how they 
were organized prior to the Arab Spring. The free space of social media gave these 
groups the ability to stay connected despite government tactics to keep them separated. 
Later in the protests, government offices attempted to enter the discussion on 
social media sites by increasing their output of information and responding to ongoing 
discussions in this space. Security forces also used social media sites to identify and 
target those responsible for violence and what they deemed as illegal protests. These 
actions worked to hinder the use of this free space. Over time, social media was no longer 
a protest dominated space but allowed a competition of ideas as multiple groups used this 
forum for dialogue and information dissemination. 
 Did the use of social media by both protesters and government cancel the 
effects of the other? 
There is currently no clear answer to this question. Early in the protests, protesters 
dominated social media sites but the government has since made strides in its use. 
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Another way to answer this question is to identify the how each side used social media to 
portray and disseminate information and the use symbols to unify groups. In early 2011, 
the regional Arab Spring movement was a strong unifying symbol for protesters.121 As 
time progressed and the Bahraini protesters were unable to capitalize on its success as the 
other countries had done, this symbol lost its power. Instead of a movement for reform 
under the Arab Spring, the historic sectarian based division influenced and dominated the 
calls for regime change. This lessening of the impact of the Arab Spring as a symbol 
allowed an opportunity for other players to attempt to sway opinion through this free 
space. The government initially used sectarianism but then changed to nationalism, 
separating violent protesters out as terrorists. It appears that the governments was using 
the same tactic of divide and conquer just with a different symbol. If this new symbol of 
nationalism does not work to unite the people while separating out violent offenders, the 
question for the future is what group will find the symbol that is able to utilize the already 
formed social networks and mobilize the masses? 
2. Hypotheses 
During the course of this research, multiple hypotheses were used to frame the 
problem. The first hypothesis, protests groups saw benefits in activation of protesters 
through social media in non-violent protests due to a repressive environment, was 
validated but cannot be universally applied. The repressive environment in Bahrain led to 
increased online activism and discussion leading to an increased mobilization in 2011.122 
Also, social media interactions with Egypt and Tunisia allowed an insight into a larger 
regional movement that was not available through the state-run media channels. In this 
sense, social media sites broadened the understanding of the regional situation to 
Bahraini citizens and increased their likelihood to participate in mobilization. 
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The second hypothesis, that protest groups utilized social media to broadcast their 
message to a larger audience in order to increase pressure of the government, was also 
validated. Throughout the conflict, media outlets continued to use information, images 
and video from social media in their ongoing coverage of Bahraini protests.123 The active 
use by protesters is demonstrated in their editing and publishing of videos and images 
aimed to display a unified fight against a repressive regime. Images of security forces 
retreating from protesters, bloody protesters from police brutality and security forces in 
full riot gear entering villages displayed prominently in protest groups postings on 
RevolutionBahrainMC’s YouTube channel. 
The research validated that the government and mainstream protest organizations 
such as Al Wefaq used social media as a means to educate and inform the population 
while causing further cleavages that advanced their causes. The ability to sway public 
opinion only became effective after protest groups lost the momentum to change the 
regime. At this point, protest group’s hope diminished and they began broadening their 
search for hope for the future. This gave Al Wefaq and the government the opportunities 
to use social media to sway public opinion. Al Wefaq appeared intent on unifying the 
movement behind them while the government appeared intent on dividing the opposition 
while strengthening support for the government. The government, in particular, increased 
their messaging and online presence after 2011 though the research did not show that the 
increased presence caused further cleavages in the society. This thesis argues that the 
evidence shows that the society was further divided along sectarian lines due to 
government rhetoric and accusations of Iranian meddling rather than their involvement in 
social media  
My final hypothesis was that although social media encouraged activism and 
increased the flow of information and timing of events in Bahrain, in the end it was just 
another form of communication.124 As seen in this study, the grievances that were found 
in society prior to 2011 did not change after the initial uprising with no substantial 
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changes from social media use. Social media and its correlating networking and use of 
free spaces did appear to change the dynamics of the conflict by increasing the 
information flow within the region and country. It gave a new source of information and 
perspective to protesters allowing the people to witness firsthand protests going on in 
their country without actively participating. Social media only compressed the timeline of 
an ongoing situation in Bahrain. Social media did not appear to add new grievances to the 
process, rather, it gave an opportunity for people to unite behind their grievances under a 
common symbol or banner. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The scope of this research was limited by factors unique to Bahrain. Geographic 
location and containment of an isolated island along with historic grievances and deep 
sectarian divides in the country were instrumental to the protests of 2011. Bahrain was 
also impacted by the larger sectarian conflict in the region as they received security 
assistance from Saudi Arabia while continuing public rhetoric that Iran was manipulating 
and supporting the protests. In addition to political and social unique qualities of the 
island, high Internet penetration rates and cell phone usage further enabled the impact 
that social media had in Bahrain.  
This research indicates the need for further study in protesters use of social media 
as a free space on a larger scale. Specifically, how social media can unify a diverse group 
of people through increased communication in a digital free space and the use of symbols 
to unify mobilization efforts. The finding of this research can be applied in multiple 
settings as social media continues to be used in protests around the world. Although the 
conditions found in Bahrain are unique, social media’s use as a free space is not limited 
by these factors in all settings and can be found in movements around the world.125 
How social media appeared to prolong the actions of the protest mobilization 
while being used in real time to coordinate events to offset police actions is another 
potential area of future research. The increased communication allowed through social 
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media to monitor other protest activities enabled an increase in coordination amongst 
both violent and peaceful protesters. Implications of this research have the potential to aid 
security efforts to monitor, track and potentially predict violence associated with protests 
through social network linkages. Using the free space of social media to organize and 
mobilize protests not only enables protesters but also governments to potentially benefit 
from this information. Identification of linkages between social networks further aids 
efforts to identify potential future protests and or violence but also identify those 
responsible after the event. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although ultimately the protest movement did not meet its desired intent of 
regime change, the use of social media altered the journey rather than the destination. 
Social interaction amongst the youth population, the dissemination of information 
internal to the protesters as well as communication between the government and the 
masses were all affected. More important in my assessment was the social network that 
was built in 2011 still endures to this day. 
Social media use in protest activities will likely continue to be a topic of 
discussion as Internet usage rates increase around the world.126 Its use in Bahrain 
indicated that the need for government’s awareness and ability to adapt to this new free 
space was critical to offset the effects social media use showed amongst protesters. As 
the conflict in Bahrain continues, the battle in this new free space to unify or divide the 
populace will help determine the outcome of future stability or continued unrest. 
                                                 
126 “Internet Growth Statistics,” Internet World Stats, November 20, 2015, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm.  
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